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The recognition of the profound impact of corporations on the economies and societies of all 
countries of the world has focused attention on the growing importance of corporate 
governance. There is an ongoing diversity of corporate governance systems, based on 
historical cultural and institutional differences that involve different approaches to the values 
and objectives of business activity. Sound corporate governance is universally recognised as 
essential to market integrity and efficiency, providing a vital underpinning for financial 
stability and economic growth. As the adequacy of the existing dominant paradigms of 
corporate governance are increasingly challenged, the search for coherent new paradigms is 
a vital task for corporate governance in the future. 
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Corporate governance is of critical importance in a global economy where corporations are 
the leading players. Corporations have assumed the role of the compelling force in the 
transformation of the world economy “the engine, worldwide, for private sector participation 
in the global market – to raise capital, create jobs, earn profits and divide the value added 
among those contributing to its success” (OECD 1998: 13). The ownership and control of 
corporations, the purposes they pursue, and the ways they are controlled, will determine the 
prospects for economic and social stability (Clarke, O’Brien and Kelley 2019). 
 
1.1 Defining Corporate Governance 
The recognition of the profound impact of corporations on the economies and societies of all 
countries of the world has focused attention on the growing importance of corporate 
governance (Clarke 2017). The most generic definition of this concern is that, “Corporate 
governance is the system by which companies are directed and controlled” (Cadbury Report 
2002: 15). Among the competing definitions of corporate governance Margaret Blair’s 
estimation encompasses the “the whole set of legal, cultural, and institutional arrangements 
that determine what publicly traded corporations can do, who controls them, how that control 
is exercised, and how the risks and returns from the activities they undertake are allocated” 
(1995:3). In a similar vein Davis (2005: 143) in New Directions for Corporate Governance, 
suggests corporate governance refers to “the structures, processes, and institutions within and 
around organizations that allocate power and resource control among participants.” 
However selective interpretations of the definition and purpose of corporate governance 




which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their 
investment’ (Shleifer and Vishny 1997: 737). The OECD proposed a broader and more 
responsible definition and purpose of corporate governance when it first published the 
original OECD Principles of Corporate Governance: 
“A good corporate governance regime helps to assure that corporations use their capital 
efficiently. Good corporate governance helps, too, to ensure that corporations take into 
account the interests of a wide range of constituencies, as well as of the communities in 
which they operate, and that their boards are accountable to the company and to the 
shareholders. This, in turn, helps to assure that corporations operate for the benefit of 
society as a whole. It helps to maintain the confidence of investors – both foreign and 
domestic – and to attract more ‘patient’ long term capital” (OECD 1999: 7). 
 
More expansively still, Cadbury (2000) in work for the World Bank idealistically recognized 
the role of corporate governance in contributing to the stability and equity of society and the 
economy: “Corporate governance is concerned with holding the balance between economic 
and social goals and between individual and communal goals. The governance framework is 
there to encourage the efficient use of resources and equally to require accountable 
accountability and stewardship of those resources. The aim is to align as nearly as possible 
the interests of individuals, corporations and society.” 
 
Therefore, the definition and meaning of corporate governance varies considerably according 
to the values, institutions, culture and objectives pursued: “Corporate governance may be 
defined broadly as the study of power and influence over decision-making within the 




paradigms or ways of conceptualizing the organization or firm” (Aguilera and Jackson 
2010:5).  
 
 1.2 Diversity in Corporate Governance Systems 
The expansive dimensions of corporate governance were narrowly translated in recent 
decades with the increasing ascendancy of financial markets and intellectual domination of 
agency theory into an almost obsessive concern for the problems of accountability and 
control involved in the dispersal of ownership of large listed corporations, and a rigid focus 
on the mechanisms that orientate managers towards delivering shareholder value (Dore 2000; 
Davis 2005; Clarke 2016b). 
 
This Anglo-American hegemonic view of the purpose of the corporation and the direction of 
governance institutions has proved central to the progress of globalization, and the advance of 
international capital markets. The rather different cultural orientations of enterprise towards 
the economy and society in Europe, Asia and other parts of the world have progressively 
been weakened (Clarke and Bostock 1994; Aguilera and Jackson 2003; 2010; Clarke 2013; 
2017; Clarke and Chanlat 2009; Aglietta and Rebérioux 2005; Amable 2003).  Both 
European and Asian perceptions of the role and significance of governance have changed in 
recent decades towards the Anglo-American view, in some respects simply in terms of 
formally adopting governance codes, in other ways more substantially such as in becoming 
more dependent upon Western capital markets. However, business leaders, governments and 
regulators in Europe and Asia while acknowledging the increasing salience of shareholder 





The insistent focus of corporate governance on boards, CEOs and shareholders – oriented 
single-mindedly towards financial markets and shareholder primacy – has not served the 
discipline well. This approach not only narrows the dimensions of corporate governance to a 
restricted set of interests, as a result it has a very limited view of the dilemmas involved in 
corporate governance (Deakin 2005; Clarke 2013; 2014a). “Bibliometric analysis of more 
than 1,000 publications shows that corporate governance research is characterized by both the 
use of agency theory as the dominant theoretical lens, and empirical samples from one 
country, typically the US and to a less extent the UK” (Kumar and Zattoni 2015a:1; Durisin 
and Puzone 2009). In fact, there are continuing and competing corporate governance systems 
in the market based Anglo-American system; the European relationship-based system; and 
the relationship-based system of the Asia Pacific, together with new approaches to 
governance in emerging economies. This ongoing diversity of corporate governance systems 
is based on historical cultural and institutional differences that involve different approaches to 
the values and objectives of business activity (Aguilera and Jackson 2003; 2010; Aglietta and 
Rebérioux 2005; Clarke 2017).  
 
Ignoring the possibility of different responsibilities and purposes for the corporation, the 
Business Roundtable of the United States, which represents the majority of the major US 
corporations, maintained a single minded commitment to shareholder primacy from the issue 
of its Principles of Corporate Governance in 1997. In a sudden apparent abandonment of the 
doctrine of shareholder primacy at the Business Roundtable August 2019 meeting in 
Washington D.C. 181 CEOs signed a new Statement on the Purpose of a Corporation (2019) 
committing to lead their companies for the benefit of all stakeholders – customers, 
employees, suppliers, communities and shareholders. The substance of these wider 






2. The Significance of Corporate Governance 
 
2.1 The origins of the corporation 
The first corporations were founded by religious and educational organisations, traders and 
merchant venturers licenced by the state. The Dutch east India Company and the English East 
India Company were prominent examples of the great ambition and huge risk associated with 
early corporate enterprise (Frentrop 2019; Stern 2019). The 1844 Joint-Stock Companies Act 
in England facilitated the process of incorporation and joint-stock companies quickly 
proliferated. Beginning in Europe and North America, but eventually in almost all 
jurisdictions, some legal version of the corporation developed. The process of incorporation 
involves the abstract concept of clothing the entity with the ‘veil’ of juridical personality. 
 
The conception of the corporation proved the inspiration for the modern business enterprise: 
the specific legal form of people and resources chartered by the state for the purpose of 
engaging in business activity. Unique characteristics distinguish the corporation from the 
other main legal forms – the sole proprietorship and the partnership. The vital elements of the 
corporation are: 
 Limited Liability 
The losses an investor may bear are limited to the capital invested in the enterprise 
and do not extend to personal assets. 




Shareholder rights may be transferred without constituting legal reorganisation of the 
enterprise. 
 Juridical Personality 
The corporation itself becomes a fictive person, a legal entity which may sue or be 
sued, make contracts and hold property. 
 Indefinite Duration 
The life of the corporation may extend beyond the participation of its original 
founders (and may continue indefinitely). 
 
 
 2.2 The increasing scale and impact of corporations 
As the scale and activity of corporations has increased immeasurably, the governance of these 
entities has assumed considerable importance.  The corporation remains one of the most 
significant if contested innovations in human history (Coase 1937; Schumpeter 1942; Polyani 
1941; Clarke, O’Brien and O’Kelley 2019). “It is not exaggeration to suggest that, with the 
possible exception of political democracy, the corporation has contributed more to human 
welfare than any other Western institution” (Stout 2019:224). While the continuing influence 
of the state may have been neglected in global commentary in recent decades, the scale and 
influence of global corporations undoubtedly continues to grow and be recognised, even as 
their composition, structure and operations are transformed. The largest international 
corporations have much greater economic clout than most countries in the world: if 
companies’ revenues and selected emerging markets GDPs are compared, the leading one 
hundred corporations are much richer than most countries. The economies of most 




international corporations. If we compare government total revenues with corporate turnover, 
of the world’s largest 100 economies 31 are countries and 69 are corporations, (World Bank 
2016). And, of course, there are a lot more corporations, with perhaps two hundred viable 
countries in the world, and several thousand large international corporations.  
 
Though the number of listed corporations in the United States peaked in the 1990s and then 
began a precipitous decline with the bursting of the internet bubble and the concentration of 
the banks, the market capitalization of US listed corporations continued to grow 
exponentially, with the global domination of the US platform technology corporations 
(Apple, Amazon, Microsoft, Google, Facebook) (Clarke and Boersma 2019; Clarke 2019b). 
In the rest of the world there was a sustained increase in the number of listed corporations 
with the total of global listed corporations increasing from 15,000 in 1975 to around 45,000 
in 2015 (Figure 1). 
 
 
Figure   1      Increase in the Number of Global Listed Domestic Companies 1975- 2016 
 
 
Business corporations have an enduring impact upon societies and economies, “how 
corporations are governed - their ownership and control, the objectives they pursue, the rights 
they respect, the responsibilities they recognize, and how they distribute the value they create 
– has become a matter of the greatest significance, not simply for their directors and 
shareholders, but for the wider communities they serve” (Clarke and dela Rama 2006: xix). 
These concerns originated with industrial capitalism and have become accentuated with the 




of financial markets, and a growing awareness of the damaging economic and social 
consequences when corporate governance failures occur.  
 
 Among governments throughout the world sound corporate governance is universally 
recognised as essential to market integrity and efficiency, providing a vital underpinning for 
financial stability and economic growth. The leading international agencies including the 
G20, OECD, IMF and World Bank have seized upon corporate governance as a means of 
managing the risk of recurring corporate failure, but also as a route to improving economic 
performance, facilitating access to capital, reducing market volatility, and enhancing the 
investment climate. This was formally acknowledged when the OECD Principles of 
Corporate Governance became the G20/OECD Principles in 2015, with the diffusion of 
corporate governance codes around the world (Cuomo et al 2016). 
 
 
2.3 The theoretical understanding of corporate governance 
The subject of corporate governance has long held a fascination for economists, lawyers and 
management theorists from the moral economy of Adam Smith (1759; 1776) to the present 
day. The frequent dilemmas involved in business formation and operation were highlighted 
by historians, who have noted the association of pioneering business activity in the first years 
of mercantilism and industrialism in the 17th and 18th century with fraud and corruption 
(Frentrop 2003; 2019; Stern 2019). Early in the 20th century Berle and Means (1933) in 
response to the devastation of the Wall Street Crash and great depression critically analysed 





According to Berle and Means professional managers were in a position to determine the 
direction of the enterprise, and shareholders had “surrendered a set of definite rights for a set 
of indefinite expectations” (Berle & Means 1933:244). After the New Deal reconstruction of 
the US economy, and the end of the Second World War, many US corporations in the 1950s 
and 1960s grew massively in scale and market domination, achieving pre-eminent positions 
in world markets. A new managerial and corporate mode of coordination of enterprise based 
on organization and planning had arrived as analysed by Coase (1937) and later by Chandler 
(1977), transcending the market. This was an era celebrated in Galbraith’s New Industrial 
State (1967) in which corporate growth and brand prestige apparently had displaced profit 
maximization as the ultimate goals of technocratic managers, as planning and administration 
in close cooperation with government had displaced market relations as the primary corporate 
dynamic (Henwood 1998:259). In this technocratic milieu shareholders were “passive and 
functionless, remarkable only in his capacity to share without effort or even without 
appreciable risk, the gains from growth by which the technostructure measures its success” 
(Galbraith 1967:356). However, the Galbraithian idyll began to disintegrate with the severe 
recession of 1973–1975, the incapacity of US corporations to compete effectively with 
Japanese and European products in key consumer market sectors on quality and price, and the 
push towards conglomerate formation by Wall Street, which was interested in managing 
multiple businesses by a new discipline of strict financial performance. Technocratic 
managerialism focused on products and consumers, was forcefully displaced by financial 
engineering focused on market indices and financial returns. 
 
At this insecure juncture in the US economy a group of Chicago based economists left an 
indelible intellectual impression of the agency problems of corporate governance (Jensen and 




the problem of principals (owners of shareholdings) ensuring their interests were pursued by 
their agents (the managers of the companies in which they held shares). This starkly simple 
proposition exercised a fierce grip on the understanding and analysis of corporate and 
managerial behaviour for many decades to come, and in turn this promoted the shareholder 
primacy movement that insisted the duty of corporations is to deliver shareholder value above 
all other considerations. 
 
This stripped-down principal/agency theory view narrows the dimensions of corporate 
governance to a restricted set of privileged interests, and as a result it has a very limited 
conception of the dilemmas involved in corporate governance: “Our perspective on corporate 
governance is a straightforward agency perspective, sometimes referred to as separation of 
ownership and control. We want to know how investors get the managers to give them back 
their money” (Shleifer and Vishny 1996). 
 
 
In reality multiple theoretical and methodological perspectives are required for an adequate 
understanding of the complexities of corporate governance (Zattoni and Van Ees 2012; 
Filatotchev and Wright 2017).  Each of the theoretical perspectives including agency, 
transaction costs, stewardship, resource based, stakeholder, managerial hegemony and class 
hegemony have a different view on enterprise and governance, different disciplinary 






Theoretical approaches to corporate governance follow a continuum from the narrow focus of 
agency theory and transaction cost theory inspired by financial economics, through 
approaches including stewardship, resource dependency, stakeholder and managerialist 
theories developed by organisational theorists, to more critical analysis originating in 
sociological and political critiques with an expansive view of the whole political economy. 
(Clarke 2004a). Each theoretical approach has its own logic and limitations, and though a 
number of the approaches represent opposing interpretations of the same problem, in some 
cases the theories serve to illuminate different dimensions of the governance problem. 
 
After agency theory, the most established theoretical approach is transaction cost economics. 
Ronald Coase (1937) insisted, (notwithstanding the assumption of neoclassical theory that the 
allocation of resources is coordinated through a series of exchange transactions on the 
market), that in the real world a considerable proportion of economic activity is organised in 
firms. Coase examines the economic explanation for the existence of firms, and why 
economic activities take place within firms rather than through markets. He explains the 
nature of firms in terms of the imperfections of markets, and in terms of the transaction costs 
of market exchange.  
 
New institutional economics differs from agency theory in that the corporate governance 
problems of firms are perceived to proceed from a number of contractual hazards. This 
approach is concerned with discovering internal measures and mechanisms which reduce 
costs associated with contractual hazards to an efficient level: the external discipline of the 
market cannot be relied on to mitigate these problems, as it has only “limited constitutional 




allocation machinery” (Williamson 1975:143). Like neo-classical economics though, the 
locus of attention remains the shareholder-manager relationship, but in this case it is because 
shareholders are perceived to “face a diffuse but significant risk of expropriation because the 
assets in question are numerous and ill-defined, and cannot be protected in a well-focused, 
transaction specific way” (Williamson 1985:1210; Learmount 2002:5). As with agency 
theory the narrowness of the focus limits the explanatory power of this analysis. 
 
In contrast to agency theory, stewardship theory acknowledges a larger range of human 
motives of managers including orientations towards achievement, altruism, and the 
commitment to meaningful work (Hernandez 2008; 2012). Stewardship theory maintains 
there is no inherent conflict of interest between managers and owners, and that optimum 
governance structures allow coordination of the enterprise to be achieved most effectively. 
Managers should be authorised to act since according to stewardship theory they are not 
opportunistic agents but good stewards who will act in the best interests of owners. 
Stewardship theory recognises a strong relationship between managers’ pursuit of the 
objectives of the enterprise, the owners’ satisfaction, and other participants in the enterprise 
reward. Davis, Schoorman and Donaldson (1997) suggest that as managers maximise 
shareholders’ wealth through raising the performance of the firm, they serve their own 
purposes. Managers balance competing shareholder and stakeholder objectives, making 
decisions in the best interests of all. However, there is an element of choice in corporate 
governance arrangements, both managers and owners can choose to have either agency or 
steward relationships, contingent upon their assessment of the motivations of each other, and 
the situation of the enterprise. Stewardship theory rescues the integrity of management as a 





There is a stream of theoretical approaches that widen the focus beyond internal monitoring, 
to explore the external challenges of corporate governance in terms of building relationships 
and securing resources. Resource dependence theory, institutional theory, and network theory 
all are interested in the external relations of corporations. Resource dependency theory 
highlights the interdependencies of organisations rather than viewing them simply in terms of 
management intentions. Hillman, Cannella and Paetzold (2000) for example examine how 
company directors may serve to connect the firm with external resources that help to 
overcome uncertainty, and provide access to relationships with suppliers, buyers, public 
policy makers and other social groups. Resource dependency approaches add a vital external 
dimension to corporate governance relationships. Stakeholder theory defines organisations as 
multilateral agreements between the enterprise and its multiple stakeholders. The relationship 
between the company and its internal stakeholders (employees, managers, owners) is framed 
by formal and informal rules developed through the history of the relationship. This 
institutional setting constrains and creates the strategic possibilities for the company (Blair 
1995; Clarke 1998). While management may receive finance from shareholders, they depend 
upon employees to fulfil the productive goals, to innovate, and to develop viable purposes 
and strategic intentions for the company. External stakeholders (customers, suppliers, 
competitors, special interest groups and the community) are equally important, and also are 
constrained by formal and informal rules and interests that businesses must respect. 
Stakeholder theory has an intellectual appeal and practical application to the complexity of 
business enterprise, however it is argued from an agency perspective that multiple 
stakeholder responsibilities can leave management with too much freedom of maneuver, 
substituting their own interests for the shareholder interests (or even wider company 





 From a more critical perspective managerialist theory focuses on the distinctions between the 
myth and the reality of the relative powers of managers and boards. Mace (1971) for example 
examines the 1960s ascendancy of US corporate executives, when powerful CEOs selected 
and controlled the boards of directors of the companies they ran. He outlines how CEOs in 
the US were able to determine board membership, to decide what boards could and could not 
do, controlled the information and professional advice the board received, and determined the 
compensation of senior executives, including often themselves. When corporations fail, the 
question always arises, ‘Where were the board of directors?’ However, there is a wide gap 
between what directors are supposed to do, what people generally assume directors do, and 
what they are actually allowed to do in practice, or are inclined to do. Mace catalogues how 
dysfunctional boards rather than being exceptional, became normal in the United States, as 
executives took control.                                                                                                                                                                
 
Finally, there are more radical theoretical critiques which suggest that corporations perpetuate 
the power of an elite, serving to exploit others in the interests of accumulating wealth and 
power for a few privileged shareholders and executives (Mills 1971). Though radical analysis 
faded after the 1960s, it has enjoyed a new lease of life in the widespread critique of the 
impact of globalization which corporations have spearheaded with unemployment in 
developed countries and poor working conditions and pay in emerging economies where 
multinational corporation investment is concentrated. Most recently there is a radical critique 
of the sustainability of corporations, that questions the impact of industry on climate change 
and the  damaging impact on the ecology (Bansal and  Hoffman  2011; Clarke 2016a; 2019; 





In conclusion the almost exclusive focus on agency theory in recent decades in the attempt to 
understand corporate governance has limited the field of inquiry, and the conception of 
shareholder value as the single defining corporate objective has fatally narrowed perceptions 
of corporate purpose and performance. The shareholder value regime is deeply flawed in 
terms of an understanding of directors’ duties (Blair 2012); company law and practice 
(Deakin 2005); and executive incentives (Lazonick 2012), and conveys a lack of 
understanding of, or interest in, what actually takes place in companies in terms of the 
advance of innovation or the generation of wealth (Lazonick 2010; 2017). 
 
 
 2.4   Accountability and Strategic Direction 
Boards of directors acting solely as monitors for shareholders, as envisaged by agency theory, 
is a one-dimensional view of the role and responsibilities of directors (Blair and Stout 2001). 
The sad paradox of this exclusive focus on the monitoring of company directors to ensure 
they deliver shareholder value is that this excludes full consideration of the value creating 
role of boards (Huse 2018). Boards of directors have a vital role to play working with the 
executives in leadership of the company and in value creation. This role is often neglected 
because of the emphasis of regulation upon the control and accountability functions of the 
board, and because of the almost exclusive focus of agency theory on control and monitoring. 
Corporate governance is not simply about accountability. Governance has an important role 
to play in value creation, innovation and strategy (Huse and Gabrielsson 2012; Zattoni and 
Pugliese 2012). Governance without strategy leads to paralysis, as strategy without 





Yet as international corporate governance regulation developed, and codes were formulated 
with corporate governance thrust into prominence by high-profile company failures, the 
concept of corporate governance almost universally became synonymous with monitoring, 
compliance and regulation almost fulfilling the dystopian dreams of agency theorists. 
Ironically this association of corporate governance with monitoring neglected the role of 
boards of directors in supporting strategies for value and growth. Corporate governance is 
essentially about accountability and strategic direction: 
“The economy depends on the drive and efficiency of its companies. Thus the effectiveness 
with which their boards discharge their responsibilities determines… competitive position. 
They must be free to drive their companies forward but exercise that freedom within the 
framework of effective accountability. This is the essence of any system of good governance 
(Cadbury 1992:11). 
 
2.5   One System or Many? 
In fact, there are different and contrasting perspectives on corporate governance, which are 
based on very different understandings of what the purpose of business enterprise actually is. 
Deriving from these different understandings of business purpose there are competing 
corporate governance systems in the market-based Anglo-American system; the European 
relationship-based system; and the relationship-based system of the Asia Pacific (Clarke 
2017; Aguilera and Jackson 2003; 2010), together with multiple other systems of governance 
in active development in the emerging economies. An assessment of the wide cross-national 
diversity of governance institutions and mechanisms was conducted by Schiehll and Martins 




on historical, cultural and institutional dilemmas that involve different approaches to the 
values and objectives of business activity. When advising on the development of corporate 
governance principles, the OECD Business Advisory Group (1998:4) stressed the importance 
of strategic choice in the determination of governance outcomes: 
“Entrepreneurs, investors and corporations need the flexibility to craft governance 
arrangements that are responsive to unique business contexts so that corporations can respond 
to necessary changes in technological competition, optimal firm organisation and vertical 
networking patterns… To obtain governance diversity, economic regulators, stock exchange 
rules, and corporate law should support a range of ownership and governance forms.” 
This injunction was subsequently largely forgotten by the OECD and other international 
agencies in their insistence in implying the Anglo-American model as the only reasonable 
way forward for other countries and regions to adopt. Yet after the signal failures of the 
Anglo-American governance system in the global financial crisis, and with the advance of the 
emerging economies, a more pragmatic corporate governance policy emerged from the 
OECD: 
“ …The regulatory framework must be fit for purpose. And in the complex and multifaceted 
world of business, this means that regulations must be designed to meet the many varying 
needs of those entrepreneurs, investors and stakeholders who are supposed to use them.  This 
is why the G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (2015) state that policy makers 
have a responsibility to establish a regulatory framework that is flexible enough to meet the 
needs of corporations that operate under widely different circumstances. Only then will it 
provide market participants with the right incentives to exploit new business opportunities 




Importantly and in order to support a dynamic business sector, regulations must also be able 
to accommodate new and innovative business practices (OECD 2018:9). 
 
Hence Aquilera et al (2016) argue there needs to be a degree of freedom for corporate 
governance practices to be contingent, developing in response to the economic and social 
context. Potentially there are multiple effective configurations of governance practices with a 
need to understand the different industry and firm pressures to adopt or differentiate from 
established practices due to developments in technology, society, finance and markets. From 
these processes firms emerge ranging from the constant creation of a vast mass of small 
business enterprises, to large complex corporate groups, and to the virtual corporations 
populating the internet. 
 
Superiority of any one system of governance cannot be accepted as the convergence theorists 
insist (O’Sullivan (2001); Lane 2004; Clarke 2004a; Clarke 2009). Confidence and trust in 
the Anglo-American system after successive market crashes cannot be assumed, even if 
recovery is often quicker than expected (Lorsch 2005). These recurrent crises in the Anglo-
American system are inter-connected. For example, essentially after the crises of 2001 the US 
economy was resuscitated by trillions of dollars of cheap debt which in turn caused an 
unsustainable housing boom, the unwinding of which caused the global financial crisis of 
2007/2008, with devastating consequences for international financial stability that have 
persisted to the present day. There is a deep historical tendency in the Anglo-American model 
to instability and inequity (MacAvoy and Millstein 2004; Clarke 2004b). The advance of 
structural extreme inequality in the United States and the rest of the world has visibly 
undermined the stability of the society and economy and badly scarred democratic politics 




inappropriateness in the insistence upon a rapid adoption of this Anglo-American model in all 
other regimes as Hansmann and Kraakman (2001) among others once advocated (Mitchell 
2001; Clarke and dela Rama 2006; Clarke 2014a). 
 
 
2.6   The Wide Dimensions of Governance 
The competing ideologies and institutional structures that contest the corporate governance 
space are highlighted by Tricker (2008), one of the pioneers in this field. Historically 
property rights, managerialist, corporatist, stakeholder and other conceptions of the 
understanding of the corporation, its essential structure and mechanisms, and its proper role 
in the economy and society, have wielded influence at different times. Tricker advances a 
wide perspective:  
“The modern enterprise, in reality, is itself loosely bonded and involves complex and 
interacting networks of relationships. It is better perceived as a set of dynamic open systems – 
coalitions of interests between parties…Looking ahead the one thing that seems certain is that 
the existing diversity and complexity of forms of corporate enterprise will continue and, very 
probably, increase. Alternative paradigms of corporate governance will be needed to improve 
the effectiveness of governance, to influence the healthy development of corporate 
regulation, and to understand the reality of the political processes by which companies are 
governed rather than the structures and mechanisms through which governance is exercised” 
(Tricker 2008:2,8). 
 
As interest in understanding corporate governance has grown, the question of how this relates 
to the institutions and practices of public and global governance has arisen: while large 




public organizations remain influential in many national sectors, and the role of global 
institutions has become more critical both for regulation and coordination of the world 
economy.  Apreda (2003) provides a unifying view of governance as a distinctive field of 
learning and practice identifying interlinked themes that arise from corporate, public and 
global governance, and identifies the core of governance in all three domains as: 
i. a founding constitution 
ii. a system of rights and duties; 
iii. mechanisms for accountability and transparency; 
iv. monitoring and performance measures; 
v. stakeholder rights; 
vi. good governance standards; 
vii. independent gatekeepers. 
 
Returning specifically to corporate governance, Cadbury reminds us of the ethical dimension 
of corporate values and activity: that firms exist not just for the profit of their immediate 
owners, but to fulfill a wider social responsibility. The boundaries of what constitutes 
corporate governance are greatly extended by Turnbull (2012) from the narrow Anglo-
American focus on market oriented publicly traded firms. He claims, “Corporate governance 
includes all types of firms whether or not they are formed under civil or common law, owned 
by the government, institutions or individuals, privately or publicly traded” (2012:433).  
Agency theory is almost entirely concerned with listed companies with unitary boards 
operating in market systems. However, Turnbull illustrates how the great majority of 
companies in most economies are not listed on stock exchanges, have compound boards 
representing diverse shareholder and other stakeholder interests, and have an attenuated 




relevant when economic transactions are mediated by cultural priorities; business related 
associations, trade, vocational, family, social and political networks” (Turnbull 2012: 435). 
 
In this context the finance model of the firm in which the central problem of corporate 
governance is how to construct rules and incentives to align the behavior of managers with 
the interests of owners, needs to be supplemented with other models of corporate control 
including the stewardship, stakeholder, and political models applying not simply financial 
analysis but a cultural and power analysis among other perspectives. For example, from a 
cultural perspective, business dealings rather than being conducted on the basis of purely 
rational-legal financial considerations, are “transactions conducted on the basis of mutual 
trust and confidence sustained by stable, preferential, particularistic, mutually obligated, and 
legally non-enforceable relationships. They may be kept together either by value consensus 
or resource dependency – that is through ‘culture’ and ‘community’ – or through dominant 
units imposing dependence on others” (Hollingsworth et al 1994:6). As Armitage et al 
(2017:150) argue  “An important implication of such path‐dependency, particularly in the 
context of emerging economies, is that, while regulators and corporate governance activists 
promote the adoption of international best practices, the differences in formal and informal 
institutions interact with firm‐level governance developments to provide a basis for 
multidimensional, multi‐level corporate governance systems that incorporate the evolution of 
their country‐specific institutions.” 
 
International corporate governance is a set of diverse and contested systems, not a unified and 
uniform system (Clarke 2005; Clarke and Bostock 1997). The impressive extent to which 
principles of robust governance and accountability have been diffused around the world and 




confidence that corporate behavior has changed to the same degree (Clarke 2000; Aguilera 




3. Ownership and Control 
3.1   The Separation of Ownership and Control in the United States 
The structure of ownership is vital in corporate governance, as it ultimately determines who 
has the decision-making power in the corporation (Zattoni 2011; Kumar and Zattoni 2015). 
The fundamental assumption of a universal separation of ownership and control upon which 
agency theory rests is open to challenge not only in the rest of the world where majority 
ownership remains deeply embedded, but even in the United States which is portrayed as the 
archetype of the market based corporate governance system (La Porta et al 1999). Zeitlin 
(2008) offered an early critique of the managerialist theories which proposed the separation 
of ownership and control suggesting this meant professional managers had effectively 
displaced capitalist owners in the running of large corporations. The belief in the 
disappearance of the control by proprietary interests of the largest corporations is questioned 
by the patterns of ownership holdings within and between corporations; the extent of 
interlocking directorships; the connections with banks and other financial institutions, and 
who owns these; and the wider networks of ownership and influence. 
 
In fact, large-block shareholders frequently possess the influence and expertise to effectively 
capture property rights and gain control of firms, giving them benefits and rights which are 




ownership of shares in a corporation, as the largest shareholder, might be leveraged into 
effective control of the company. A contingency theory of corporate governance is proposed 
by Kang and Sorensen (2008) where the effect of ownership structure on firm performance is 
contingent on the fit between owner types and the industry market context, depending on the 
power relations between organizational participants in relationships that cannot simply be 
defined in contractual terms.  
Defining a controlling shareholder as owning 10% of the voting shares of a corporation 
directly or through a chain of other shareholdings, Gadhoum et al  (2008) reach the startling 
conclusion that 59% of listed US corporations have a controlling shareholder, a higher 
incidence than Japan, and 36% of US corporations are controlled by a family, similar to 
Germany, and higher than in Japan, France or the UK. Finally, 24% of US corporations are 
controlled and managed by a family, similar to East Asia. Therefore, they suggest the 
principal consequences of strong shareholder protection in the US may be less to prevent 
professional managers from exploiting dispersed shareholders, than to prevent controlling 
shareholders from exploiting minority shareholders. The entire focus of agency theory on 
problems of monitoring management free riding and asymmetric information may help to 
explain the limited success of successive interventions aimed at managers, when controlling 
shareholders often represent a greater threat of the expropriation of other interests.  
 
3.2   The Separation of Ownership and Control around the World 
The concentration of ownership in the rest of the world is very apparent, and there is 
significantly less evidence of any separation of ownership and control. Business groups 
which amalgamate the interests of legally independent companies through various formal and 




evident in many parts of Europe (Colli and Colpan 2016; Clarke and Monkhouse1995). 
Claessens et al (2000) extend the analysis of La Porta et al (1999) in a detailed study of the 
concentration of ownership and control of 2,980 publicly traded companies in nine East 
Asian countries.  
What is revealed in Claessens (2000) is an extensive historical pattern of control enhanced by 
pyramid structures, cross holdings among firms, and voting rights exceeding formal 
ownership share. The concentration of voting rights is critical to the governance of companies 
since it allows determination of dividend policies, investment projects, executive 
appointments, and other business strategies. More than two-thirds of firms were controlled by 
a single shareholder, and the top management of 60% of firms was related to the family of the 
controlling shareholder. Owners and managers may be different people, but they are not 
separated. A significant share of national corporate assets was possessed by a small number 
of families, with 16.6% of all assets in Indonesia, and 17.1% of assets in the Philippines 
traced to the ultimate control of a single family. In Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand 
ten families had control of half of all corporate assets; and in Hong Kong and Korea they 
controlled a third of all corporate assets. This historical concentration of wealth which 
continues to a degree to the present day represents a formidable barrier to the evolution of the 
legal and institutional reforms of corporate governance and economic activity (Claessens 
2004; Claessens et al 2000). 
 
Though there are many widely held companies in Western Europe, an analysis of ownership 
structure and the means by which owners gain control rights in excess of their ownership 
rights by Faccio and Lang (2008) demonstrate that ownership concentration is more 




family-controlled firms are 44.29% of the market. Devices to intensify control are widespread 
including the use of multiple classes of shares, pyramidal ownership structures, multiple 
control chains, and cross-holdings. The recent growth of equity markets in Europe, and the 
related increase in the market for corporate control, might unsettle this pattern of consolidated 
ownership to a degree in future, but the concentrated pattern of ownership and control is so 
integral to the economies and societies of Europe it is likely to change slowly. Substantial 
evidence of a serious movement in the opposite direction exists in the post-Soviet experience 
in Russia, with the redistribution of vast state owned industries such as oil and gas into very 
few private hands. Gurlev and Rachinsky (2008) examine how a small number of oligarchs 
control a substantial part of the Russian economy. The industrial oligarchs are often 
considered as the only effective counter-weight to a predatory state bureaucracy, though are 
also seen as stripping the wealth from Russian firms to send overseas, in the process 
undermining any belief in the viability of a market economy. The oligarchs have contributed 
to making post-Soviet Russia one of the most inequitable of the developed nations, with the 
richest ten oligarch families owning 60% of Russia’s stock market. 
 
 3.3    Family Ownership 
Despite the emphasis in the governance literature on the separation of ownership and control 
for most of the last century, the small family firm remains the predominant form of enterprise 
universally. “Family firms as an ownership form dominate both emerging and advanced 
economies and account for the majority of firms worldwide” (Aguilera et al 2015: 161; La 
Porta et al 1999). The high incidence of family ownership would not be so universal 
however, if family owned firms did not enjoy some distinct and enduring competitive and 




consequences for firm performance (Kumar and Zattoni 2016a). Historically family-
controlled firms have often been associated with nepotism, minority shareholder 
expropriation, inefficient risk-bearing, and under-investment (Fama and Jensen 1983).  
 
Recently there has been more recognition of family firms’ unique capacity to accumulate and 
utilize assets, which accounts for their ubiquity in developing countries where they are often 
regarded as the engines of the economy (Whyte 1996). Carney (2008) attempts to go beyond 
this, arguing that organizational value-creating attributes are embedded in the firm’s system 
of corporate governance in which specific incentives, authority structures, and norms of 
accountability generate particular capabilities. The vast majority of family enterprises remain 
small and appear best equipped for trading, franchising, and small-scale manufacturing, 
demonstrating parsimony and efficiency advantages in certain industries. Certainly, family 
firms demonstrate resilience, in their longevity, stakeholder outcomes and institutional 
impacts (van Essen et al 2015). Assessment of the economic impact of family firms needs to 
balance their capacity to substitute for numerous institutional voids especially in developing 
economies, with their potential to restrain the development of other forms of social and 
institutional capital. 
 
  3.4    Institutional Investors: Reuniting Ownership and Control 
In recent times in advanced market economies there has emerged an even greater force for 
reuniting ownership and control in the rapid and immense growth of the institutional 
investors. A transformation has occurred in the ownership of corporate equity with individual 
investors replaced by pension funds, insurance companies and mutual funds. In the US 




owners held 60% of the stock in the largest 1,000 firms. Hawley and Williams (2008) 
consider how institutional managers have become the fiduciaries of the ultimate beneficiaries, 
with holdings so diversified that they care not just about the governance and performance of 
individual companies but about the performance of the economy as a whole. Institutions 
consider both portfolio-wide issues and economy-wide issues in order to maximize their 
wealth in the long term and will increasingly look at events and actions not in isolation, but in 
terms of the effects that may lead to long term benefits. Inevitably this involves institutions 
having a regard for wider social, economic and environmental issues that will impact upon 
financial returns in the long run, extending their fiduciary duties in the process. 
 
The role of institutions is growing in all the advanced industrial countries as their share of 
corporate equity increases. Davis (2008) assesses the relation between the growth of 
institutions, equity finance, corporate governance and performance. These relationships may 
be more salient in market oriented Anglo-Saxon economies, but the influence of the 
institutional investors is increasing in Europe and Japan. An increasing concentration of 
assets among a small group of professional investors employed by the institutions has greatly 
increased the capacity of these large equity holders to exercise influence on boards including 
over executive compensation, share repurchases and anti-takeover devices. “The thrust of the 
influence has been to increase the vigilance of directors in their role as monitors of 
management, leading to greater board discipline of management around enhancing total 
shareholder returns” (Useem 2012). 
 
The growing dominance of equity holdings by institutional investors in Anglo-Saxon 




on the takeover mechanism to discipline managers. Securing improvements in corporate 
governance may boost the share price and performance of companies the institutions invest 
in, but also have beneficial consequences at the macro-economic level as managers of all 
firms alter their behaviour in response to the new business environment. While institutional 
returns have undoubtedly benefited from this new regime of increased dividend distributions, 
less fixed investments and higher productivity growth in the corporate sector, questions could 
be posed whether these strategies are allowing sufficient investment for innovation and future 
business growth (Lazonick 2007). 
 
However, when analysing the impact of investor activism, it is important to distinguish the 
contrasting investment strategies of different types of institutional investor: though often 
aggregated together the pension funds, insurance companies, and mutual funds have different 
characteristics and objectives (and of course hedge funds and other investment vehicles have 
markedly different strategies again) (McNulty and Nordberg 2016; Stathopoulos and 
Voulgaris 2016; Clarke 2007). Ryan and Schneider (2008) distinguish a range of institutional 
activism from cooperative to hostile and suggest various characteristics that may influence 
the propensity to activism including the size of the fund, investment time horizon, 
performance expectations, sensitivity to business relationships, the size of holding, and 
commitment to active or passive investing.  
 
As a former CEO of a large mutual fund, Bogle (2008) witnessed what he defines as the 
ascendancy of capitalism that benefits managers at the expense of owners in the late 20th 
century and issues a clarion call for greater institutional investor activism. Beyond the 




looks for a change in the orientation of corporate management in the US towards active 
corporate citizenship, more independent boards, aligning executive stock options with long 
term performance, more transparent accountability, and a greater sense of fiduciary duty. 
This growing sentiment for a re-awakened institutional activism represents a real challenge to 
corporate boards and directors to attend more adequately to their governance responsibilities.  
 
 
  3.5    Institutional Investors and Long-Term Value Creation 
The institutional investors are now the major players in all investment asset classes. Pension 
funds, investment funds and insurance companies more than doubled their total assets under 
management from USD 36 trillion in 2000 to USD 73.4 trillion in 2011 and have continued 
growing rapidly since with PWC (2020) estimating assets under management at in excess of 
USD 100 trillion. Investment in global stock markets remains the largest asset class invested 
in for pension funds and investment funds, however the increase in the assets of the investors 
has outstripped the growth of global stock markets (Çelik and Isaksson 2014:97). 
 
The growing economic significance and market power of institutional investors suggests they 
may be central to the future transformation of corporate governance. The institutional 
investors’ simultaneous and contradictory desires for the immediate results of short-term 
returns, sustained performance, and corporate social responsibility are creating corporate 
governance confusion. As the power of the institutions expands further they could either 
become an irresistible force for further economic instability induced by short-termism, or 
they could impress upon markets and companies’ longer term horizons, and the pursuit of 




investors upon corporate governance have yet to be fully understood and appreciated 
including: 
 the complex relationships that exist across the institutional investment sector, in 
which corporate governance will play a greater role as the funds under the control of 
these institutions further increase;  
 the increasing sophistication of the corporate governance policies of the institutional 
investors;  
 the significance of the institutions’ own governance as they seek to influence the 
entities in which they invest, and the criticality of the governance of the investment 
value chain, the complexities of which have often remained hidden; 
 the efficiency and effectiveness of existing methods of institutional investor 
participation in corporate governance, including voting procedures, the conduct of 
annual general meetings (AGMs) and other forms of corporate engagement with 
institutional shareholders;  
 the nature of investment institutions’ trustees’ roles, resources and expertise in 
carrying out their responsibilities;  
 how in carrying out their fiduciary duties institutional investor principals and agents 
exercise their discretion with regard to investment risk, performance, investment 
horizons and sustainability (Clarke 2017:152). 
As John Rogers of the CFA Institute insists “The future of finance needs to be less about 
leverage, financial engineering, and stratospheric bonuses and more about efficiently and 
cleanly connecting capital with ideas, long-term investing for the good of society, and 





In this context, two kinds of investor activism at opposite ends of the spectrum need to be 
carefully distinguished, ranging from the speed of the electronic reflexes of the high-
frequency traders (Clarke 2014c), to the long-term commitments of values-based investors: 
•  short-term, often secretive, but sometimes highly publicized, shareholder activism 
focused upon immediate returns for themselves; and  
•  the wider shareholder activism movement pressing for long-term value creation, 
responsible corporations and the best interests of all stakeholders including 
shareholders.  
This wider and more values-based responsible movement is continuing to grow in scale and 




4 Boards and Directors 
The board of directors is the epicentre of corporate governance, the arena in which all of the 
mechanisms of governance are required to respond to market signals, institutional pressures 
and strategic possibilities in order to secure the commercial viability and accountability of the 
business (Huse 2007; 2018). The evident fact that boards of directors often do not live up to 
these great expectations is one of the continuing dilemmas of corporate governance. 
Whenever a major corporation fails, the first resounding question is ‘Where was the board?’ 
The disappointing answer is that if the board of directors were not asleep at the wheel, they 
certainly did not demonstrate the strategic alertness or fiduciary commitment that ostensibly 




The contribution of boards of directors is widely recognised, and invariably boards are 
established to govern large and complex corporations in both the private and public sector. 
But also boards of directors are universally adopted in smaller organizations in public service, 
and in the professional, commercial and voluntary sectors. Yet the evidence concerning 
boards’ contribution to corporate governance and performance is not clear: “Evidence 
concerning direct relationships between board attributes and corporate performance is scant, 
ambiguous and not conclusive” (Adams et al 2010:58). The interdependencies between 
boards and firm performance are complex and require a number of theoretical perspectives to 
comprehend in an integrated way (Daily et al 2003). 
 
However, integrating different theoretical approaches is only possible when the underlying 
assumptions fit. Major approaches to the analysis of board effectiveness include a structural 
approach of finance and economics informed by agency theory; that focuses on attributes 
such as board size and composition; and management and organizational research focussing 
either on board relationships or board behaviour informed from a sociological or social-
psychological perspective. Fundamental differences in the perspectives include assumptions 
about rational and self-interested behaviour; the emphasis or neglect of fundamental 
contingencies in corporate governance and the heterogeneity of corporations; the significance 
of the interdependencies of corporate governance institutions at national level that impact on 
board characteristics; how board direction and characteristics are endogenous and the result 
of strategic choice; and how board research has tended to take boards as monolithic entities 
when they are composed of individuals operating in a team, with implications for the 





All boards necessarily are based on creative tension, exhibiting the capacity to question and 
challenge, as well as to support and sustain. Frequently the greatest source of tension is 
between what the board of directors believe is their legitimate desire to exercise ultimate 
control of the company, and management’s determination to retain what they define as the 
necessary level of operational control of the business (Demb and Neubauer1992; Carter and 
Lorsch 2004). Usually this tension is interpreted through an agency perspective of the need to 
discipline managers to deliver value to shareholders involving: 
“ ..The agency conflicts among the different agents related to the firm and the effectiveness 
of the internal and external control mechanisms in inducing managerial value enhancing 
actions. These controls traditionally have been classified as internal or external. Internal 
controls principally include the board of directors and mutual monitoring among managers 
(Fama 1980; Fama and Jensen 1983), the direct managerial share ownership (Jensen and 
Meckling 1976), the use of variable managers’remuneration schemes, the supervisory role 
played by the large shareholders (Demsetz and Lehn 1985) and the use of debt financing 
(Jensen 1986). External controls are exerted by the market for corporate control (Grossman 
and Hart 1980), the managerial labour market (Fama, 1980) and the product market (Hart, 
1983)” (Fernandez and Arrondo 2005:857). 
 
 4.1    Directors Duties and Agency Theory 
The doctrine that corporations must be managed to maximise shareholder’s returns took firm 
hold by the early 1990s and helped induce large corporations to pursue increasingly risky 
financial strategies in their relentless drive to enhance shareholder value. Yet contrary to 
popular myth corporate law in no jurisdiction internationally requires corporate directors to 




incorporates shareholder primacy or shareholder value (Blair 2012; Stout 2012).  Corporate 
law in the US and UK states that they must act “in the best interests of the corporation” 
(Bratton and Wachter 2010). The shareholder primacy doctrine claims that shareholder value 
maximisation is the singular social and economic goal of the corporation because it 
maximises the overall wealth being created by the corporation, disciplining management to 
this metric. 
 
However, shareholder value can be increased not by adding to the social wealth generated by 
the enterprise for all stakeholders, but by extracting value from other stakeholders. “The idea 
that maximising shareholder value is equivalent to maximising the total social value created 
by a firm seems obviously wrong to anyone who observes the various ways that corporations 
can (and do) externalise some of their costs onto employees, customers or the communities in 
which they operate” (Blair 2012:64). The flawed principles of shareholder value have 
structurally undermined the institutions and practices of corporate governance and 
contributed to a long series of corporate governance disasters, including the global financial 
crisis. 
The pursuit of shareholder value has critically weakened the capacity of the corporation to 
generate value for the longer term, and often persuades directors to sanction high-risk 
strategies for short term returns. Commitment to the shareholder value doctrine can prove 
irresponsible and dangerous (Aglietta and Reberious 2005; Gelter 2009). Bratton and 
Wachter (2010) argue that firms that were most influenced by market pressures to increase 
their share price in the years leading up to the financial crisis were the firms that recklessly 





Directors do have the authority and responsibility in law to consider the interests of all 
stakeholders in the corporate enterprise, and to find outcomes of value to all parties (Blair 
2012). Blair and Stout (1999) have outlined an alternative team production theory of 
corporate governance and directors’ duties which recognises that productive activity requires 
multiple parties to contribute to the enterprise in complex and integrated ways. This 
perspective allows directors to recognise and value the contributions of all who engage in 
pursuing the success of the business enterprise. The board is identified here as a critical 
coordinating body, tasked to represent and mediate between all stakeholders that add value, 
assume unique risk and possess strategic information critical for firm operations (Kaufmann 
and Englander 2005). 
 
This extended team production approach rests upon a conception of the firm as a nexus of 
team-specific assets invested by stakeholders. These investments create valuable resources 
that are difficult for other companies to emulate, and create competitive advantage and higher 
returns for firms in possession of these unique resources (Barney 1991; Wang and Barney 
2006). The board itself attributes important capabilities to the process of value creation in the 
firm, including relational, firm, and market analytical and functional abilities. These dynamic 
capabilities of boards represent the ability to reconfigure internal and external assets and 
competencies, in order to address the challenges of changing external environments (Teece 
and Pitelis 2009). 
 
 4.2    Who Controls the Company? 
There is almost universally a degree of tension between the board and management, which 




though the board does have formal power over management, in practice management 
dominates the board. Mizruchi (2003) offers a different view insisting the board of directors 
remains the ultimate centre of control. The degree of control may vary depending on the 
relative performance of the firm, as boards tend to become more involved at times of crisis. 
Board members may not be involved with the day to day management or have a close interest 
in the more technical aspects of the company, however they possess ‘bottom line control’ in 
setting a framework within management must operate, and in retaining the power to hire and 
fire the chief executive if management does not perform accordingly. (Indeed, in recent 
decades the average tenure of CEOs of US corporations has fallen dramatically in a context 
of greater competitiveness and uncertainty to which boards may have contributed). Weir et al 
(2008) identify the external as well as internal governance mechanisms that may discipline 
management, highlighting the continuing impact of the market for corporate control as a 
disciplinary mechanism, and insisting the relationship between governance mechanisms and 
company performance is a complex one, calling for more flexibility in the development of 
company specific governance structures appropriate for companies at different stages in their 
life-cycle, and operating in different markets.  
 
The growing number of shareholder proposals to company annual meetings represents a 
further resilient disciplining force upon both boards and management. Loring and Taylor 
(2006) illustrate how institutional investors have enjoyed increasing success in impressing 
their views through the proxy process on issues such as executive compensation and poison 
pills. Finally, Fernandez and Arrondo (2005) emphasise the existence of multiple alternatives 
of control arguing the composition and impact of the board is influenced by the intensity of 
the control provided by other mechanisms including the incentive effects of managerial stock 





A further dimension of board/management relations is revealed by Baysinger and Hoskisson 
(1990) who investigate how board composition and governance orientation may influence the 
strategic decision-making process and strategic outcomes in large corporations. Strategic 
effectiveness involves achieving an alignment between control strategies and the strategic 
context of the firm. Business strategies involving substantial risk require internal controls that 
are rich in information and involve open and subjective corporate relations. In contrast lower 
risk strategies can be managed using more formal and objective controls. For example, 
Hoskisson and Hitt (1988) found reliance on formal financial controls and incentives is 
negatively associated with the extent of research and development intensity. While outsider 
dominated boards may be appropriate in larger, diversified corporations, it is possible more 
insider-based boards are appropriate for small R & D intensive firms.  
 
Stiles and Taylor (2002) examine further the board’s role in strategic decision-making. The 
board’s role is not to formulate strategy, but to set the context for strategic thinking, and to 
review management’s strategic proposals, changing these if necessary. This central role 
attributed to the board in the strategic process is contrary to the managerialist view of the 
passivity of the board: “First, the board is the ultimate arbiter of what constitutes the focus of 
the company (‘what business are we in?’, ‘what areas should we go into?’) Secondly, through 
selective screening and confidence building, the capacity for innovation and entrepreneurship 
can be regulated. Thirdly, through constant examination of the business definition and 
corporate strategy, the commitment to certain strategies or business sectors may be 
questioned and so boards may be instrumental in breaking organizational habits and forcing 





Boards of directors’ roles in strategic direction have changed over time, and in different 
contexts, for example historically boards have needed to take firm control of company 
strategy at times of crisis, even if they did not do so before. Research on boards from the 
1970s onwards focused on the relative passivity of boards, and how they were frequently 
subject to managerial hegemony (Mace 1971). By the early 1990s agency theory became the 
dominant framework for the analysis of the contribution of boards, utilising quantitative data, 
but indicating uncertainty regarding consequences of board involvement (Fama and Jensen 
1983; Sundaramerthy and Lewis 2003) From the 2000s onwards though agency theory 
remained influential, analysis from a behavioural perspective including stakeholder, resource-
based, and stewardship theory became common. These approaches focus on boards’ 
participation and contribution to strategic decision-making and outcomes utilising qualitative 
research to understand more about the inner dynamics of boards and their relationship with 
management (Pugliese and Zattoni 2012; Huse 2007; Hillman et al 2009). Boards of directors 
are now subject to greater scrutiny regarding their influence and decisions, and evidence 
regarding board and company performance more critically examined. 
 
4.3  Maintaining Balance: The Role of the Chair 
If the board is to exercise a strategic role and to provide accountability, the position of chair 
of the board assumes greater significance. In the US this role was often combined with the 
CEO’s job constituting a duality in which the CEO not only runs the company, but also 
guides the board through its governance responsibilities. In the UK, Europe and most other 
jurisdictions (and increasingly in the US) the roles have been separated in large public 




of responsibilities permits a balance of power and authority, ensuring no individual has 
unfettered decision-making power. Cadbury in his leadership of the UK Committee on the 
Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (1992) was instrumental in encouraging this 
separation of powers internationally, as other countries adopted similar codes of corporate 
governance.  
 
The division of powers is normally that the chair is responsible for the board, and all of its 
duties, and the chief executive is responsible for the running of the company. However, this 
clear delineation of roles may often be less clear in practice, and depends on the relationship 
of the two individuals, and their relationship with the rest of the board. Coles and Hesterly 
(2000) explore further the effects of different governance arrangements at board level, 
examining leadership structure and the influence of outside directors: the independence of the 
chair is a determinant of how the market views the actions of the company (in this instance 
the acceptability of the adoption of poison pill defences), and if the chair is not independent, 
then the monitoring and control function of outside directors becomes more critical. 
 
4.4   The Struggle for Independence: Non-Executive Directors 
Independent directors are increasingly seen as central to the reform of corporate governance, 
and codes of practice increasingly suggest there should be a majority of independent directors 
on the boards of listed companies. The emphasis on the independence of directors as the 
apparent priority over other considerations is often criticized by business leaders. Matolcsy et 
al (2004) indicate that companies investing in growth involving research and development 
and intangibles not always recognized on the balance sheet do benefit from having a greater 




the behavioral dynamics of the board (Veltrop et al 2017). Roberts et al (2005) suggest it is 
critical how the interpersonal relationships between executive and non-executive directors 
develop in a company context. Non-executives both support executives and monitor their 
conduct, challenging and questioning, and drawing on their experience in support of 
executive performance. In this way non-executives maintain their confidence in the 
performance of the company, the development of strategy, and the adequacy of reporting and 
risk assessment.  
 
The Harvard Law Review proposes a resolution of the incipient development of a structural 
divide between ‘independent’ and ‘non-independent’ directors, that rather than independence 
being the lonely province of outside directors, independence as a norm should encompass all 
directors. A functional conception of director independence that balances the normative goals 
of independence-based reforms with the behavioural constraints faced by modern boards is 
suggested. The existing models of independence including the disinterested outsider, 
objective monitor, and unaffiliated professional require rethinking to extend to the collective 
efforts of every director the commitment to clear accountability and informational 
transparency. 
However, the degree of independence of directors may be questioned if they are 
representative of one small section of the community (once referred to as pale, male and 
stale). The lack of diversity on boards of directors is now an issue internationally. The gender 
imbalance on boards is presently being met by both voluntary targets for increasing the 
participation of women on boards, and by mandatory quotas that offer more immediate 




one element of a lack of diversity of skills, experience, ethnicity, and age on one-dimensional 
boards (OECD 2019). 
 
4.4   Devolving Power: Nomination and Succession Committees 
Large listed companies have developed nomination and succession committees to identify 
new directors. Yet the most important succession in any company, and often the least 
planned, is that of the chief executive. Despite decades of governance reform, the 
preparedness with which companies embark on a wide search and selection of their new CEO 
is often minimal (the tradition was a tap on the shoulder of a designated candidate after brief 
discussion between those in the inner circle). Datta et al (2002) examine the organizational 
factors that influence the desirability of the type of experience that a new CEO will bring to 
the job, and highlight firm profitability, size and advertising intensity as key. Directors will 
affirm the status-quo when financial indices are good, conversely when profitability is falling, 
internal candidates will be perceived as part of the problem, rather than likely to offer a 
solution, whereas outsiders will be regarded as offering a fresh perspective. Size is associated 
with organizational complexity, which heightens the need for organizational familiarity, and 
may mean a larger pool of talent from which to identify a successor. With regard to 
replenishing the board, Ruigrok et al (2006) examine how nomination committees are now 
entrusted with identifying and proposing new board members that will raise boards’ 
capability and independence, though to a lesser degree board diversity.  
4.5   Evaluating Executives: The Remuneration Committee 
The most serious dilemma in contemporary corporate governance is undoubtedly the 
explosion in the remuneration of CEOs of large US corporations over the last two decades. 




influenced levels of CEO reward internationally. Remuneration committees of the board of 
directors were intended to deal with this problem. Conyon and Peck (1998) review the impact 
of having remuneration committees composed entirely of non-executive directors on 
executive reward in the UK and conclude that there is little evidence of this resulting in a 
downward revision of the level of management pay. However, an independent remuneration 
committee is associated with achieving a closer alignment of management pay and corporate 
performance.  
Investors often view executive compensation arrangements as a window on the overall 
quality of the governance of corporations and attach great importance to the independence of 
the members of compensation committees of public companies. Wood (2004) elaborates the 
evolution of independence requirements of different regulators in the US including the SEC, 
NYSE and NASDAQ, raising the bar of what constitutes independence, and removing the 
protection of the business judgment rule protection for directors who fail to confirm the 
actions they approve are in the best interests of the company. The former chairman of the 
International Corporate Governance Network of institutional investors Alistair Ross Goobey 
(2005) was sceptical about the restraining influence of the reform of executive compensation 
in the face of the scale of the problem, and the potential impact of the US levels of reward: 
“The difference between U.S. and U.K. levels of remuneration became especially pronounced 
in 1997, a year in which the top executives of the largest 500 UK companies earned a total of 
$500 million, and Disney’s Michael Eisner exercised options worth $576 million and was 
awarded another 24 million options with an estimated ‘worth’ at issue of more than $200 
million”(Goobey 2005:37).   Goobey concluded soberly the best that can be hoped for is that 
greater transparency, better analysis, and more shareholders monitoring may make it less 





Better metrics are essential if executive reward is to be gauged more rigorously, to provide 
better information to measure and manage corporate and executive performance. Yet 
accounting based measures such as earnings and return on investment measure only one 
aspect of performance, and it is possible to manipulate more easily single performance 
indicators than a broader set of metrics offering a greater strategic assessment of the direction 
a company is traveling. Epstein and Roy (2005) offer a more balanced business scorecard 
developing governance sophistication in the evaluation of the performance of boards and 
CEOs around critical dimensions of long term corporate performance including finance, 
strategy, customer relations, risk management, operations, human resources, ethics and 
innovation. 
4.6    Internal Control: The Audit Committee 
Audit committees are considered another bastion of governance establishing a link between 
the external auditor and the board, reducing the risk of illegal activity and preventing 
fraudulent financial reporting. But the effectiveness of corporate auditing is open to question 
(Clarke and Dean 2007).  Spira (1999) suggests there is little evidence that audit committees 
will protect auditor independence and lead to improved financial reporting; rather they tend 
to serve a ceremonial function providing an external symbol of legitimacy. Turley and Zaman 
(2004) also question the evidence of a link between audit committees and financial reporting 
quality, commenting that though there are a number of potential impacts on aspects of 
internal control, internal audit and risk management, there is little understanding of how these 
impacts are achieved. More needs to be known about the complex environment in which 
audit committees operate, and their interaction with other parties including executive 
management and external auditors. For example, Vera-Munoz (2005) examines the 
effectiveness of audit committees in a highly charged corporate governance environment 





5. Executives and Performance 
Attention has been focused upon the importance of the role of corporate executives since 
Berle and Means first elaborated their thesis of the separation of ownership and control early 
in the 20th century. Successive commentators acknowledged the key importance of the new 
technocratic management in control of the modern corporation (Galbraith 1968) and 
chronicled the ascendancy of managerial capitalism in American business (Chandler 1977). 
The public prominence of business executives developed as the 20th century progressed, but 
it was only in the final decades of the century that the CEO, particularly in the largest US 
corporations, became such an imperial figure (It is a little ironic that this elevation of CEOs 
occurred during the era of supposed shareholder primacy). CEOs have become increasingly 
responsible for defining and projecting the objectives of corporations, and as a consequence 
have claimed an increasing share of rewards and recognition (Boyer 2005; Clarke 2014b). In 
turn, most dramatically at times of corporate failure, CEO power, performance and 
compensation have become subject to intense public scrutiny.  
 
5.1    Agency Dilemmas 
The new-found prominence of corporate executives from the 1970s coincided with the 
advance of agency theory. Fama (1980) extends the view of the firm as a set of contracts 
among factors of production elaborated by Alchian and Demsetz (1972) and Jensen and 
Meckling (1976), recognizing the separation of ownership and control, treating risk bearing 
and management as separate factors within the set of firm contracts. The firm is disciplined 
by competition from other firms, which forces the evolution of devices for monitoring the 




theorists for the effective monitoring of management, most notably the discipline of the 
capital market with leveraged takeovers (which led executives to make further efforts to 
entrench themselves), and the introduction of stock options to align executive interests with 
shareholders (which led to a massive inflation of executive reward unrelated to performance), 
both of which largely achieved the opposite of their intended effect.  
 
A more recent hope has been that institutional investors might effectively monitor the 
performance of the CEOs of the largest corporations in which they have become the majority 
shareholders. Coffee (1991) pours cold water on this aspiration “the famous generalization of 
Berle and Means that the modern public corporation produced the separation of ownership 
and control can be translated into the deeper and more accurate statement that the public 
shareholders in the modern corporation purchased liquidity at the cost of control” 
(1991:1330). He sees unstable and shifting coalitions among the institutional investors 
themselves and between majority shareholders and the management. However, Coffee 
recognizes some institutional investors may prove more effective in the monitoring role: 
institutions with large equity stakes prepared to hold over the longer term and without 
substantial conflicts of interest. 
 
The Enron implosion and associated large corporate collapses in the US in 2001/2, if 
ostensibly evidence of the worst fears of agency theorists, was emblematic of the failure of 
agency theory to find any solution to market and incentive systems that encouraged the 
rampant self-interest of executives. Arnold and de Lange (2004) illustrate how Enron’s 
executives circumvented the mechanisms supposed to discipline them, and how the market 




optimism of Enron’s CEO pronouncements. Replacing the arrogant and self-interested 
management culture of Enron, some have called for a different approach to corporate 
governance.  
 
The traditional forms of corporate governance based on assumptions of hierarchy and 
bureaucracy have to come to terms with new forms of business enterprise in which there are 
multiple agency dilemmas, in more flexible businesses based on networks and alliances. In 
these new forms of enterprise a democratization of rights and voice is required, with more 
inclusive and transparent systems of control, and mutual monitoring to promote trust. It 
should not be left to the bravery of a few individual whistle-blowers as in the case of Enron 
and WorldCom to reveal corporate malfeasance, effective systems are necessary to give 
earlier warning than this. 
 
5.2   Firm Performance 
In the context of corporate failure the focus of corporate governance is upon accountability, 
however another critical dimension is how corporate governance might contribute to firm 
performance. The relationship between corporate governance and performance is complex, 
and researchers have struggled with multiple variables, and often been disappointed in 
searching for a ‘governance effect’ in share price behaviour following changes in the 
composition of company boards, CEOs or takeover defences (Gugler 2001; Clarke 
2007:119). The balance of recent longitudinal studies in the US demonstrates high 
governance risk correlates with lower performance, and robust governance is associated with 
more sustained performance (Gompers et al 2003). In Europe and Asia companies with 




of companies (Drobetz et al 2004; Bauer and Guenster 2003).  One of the more difficult 
things in assessing the influence of corporate governance upon firm performance is to take 
into account the impact of changes in the market: at times of rapid market expansion many 
companies will perform well, in times of market recession most companies will find it more 
difficult to perform. In economic theory at least, boards and executives are rewarded on how 
well they interpret and respond to market changes, however in practice – particularly at times 
of great volatility – it is often more likely the momentum of the market simply carries 
executives and their companies along. 
 
Examining the governance of state enterprises, Bozec (2005) finds that market competition is 
positively related to firm profitability and productivity, and that it is in competitive 
environments that boards most effectively contribute to performance. Certo et al (2006) 
investigate the contribution of top management teams to firm performance, addressing the 
debate between those who maintain the influence of the composition of the top management 
is fundamental to firm performance, and those who insist the market environment shapes firm 
performance and the influence of executives is tenuous. Certo et al (2006) find that top 
management teams can provide more information processing capacity, and greater functional 
heterogeneity which contribute to firm performance. However strategic variables that 
impacted on the relationship between executives and performance included diversification, 
research and development expenditure, and internationalization: a top executive team 
composition was required to be able to cope with the complexity of these strategic choices. 
 




Accepting the complex demands of the executive role in large corporations, does not 
necessarily justify the extraordinarily large reward packages that American CEOs now claim. 
As Elhagrasey et al (1998:312) insist, “It is difficult to imagine how the highly publicized 
eight-digit compensation figures for some top corporate executives can serve shareholder 
interests or could be derived from rational compensation schemes. Some form of CEO 
influence seems obvious, and seems to be overcoming efforts by the SEC, state governments, 
institutional investors, and other interest groups to regulate compensation.”  Elhagrasey et al 
(1998) explain unrestrained CEO pay as a result of CEO power over boards of directors, 
including CEO use of co-optation, outside experts, remuneration committees, and the 
selective use of criteria to control the compensation process and rationalize and legitimize 
their compensation.  
 
Matsumura and Shin (2005) examine the intended and unintended consequences of widely 
proposed executive compensation reforms including greater independence for compensation 
committees; requiring executives to hold equity in the corporation; greater disclosure of 
executive compensation; increased institutional investor involvement; and requiring firms to 
expense stock options. They conclude that whatever remedies these proposals might offer 
given the intrinsic limitations of regulatory actions intended to discipline executive pay, what 
is required is a stronger ethical framework which redefines corporate objectives and takes 
account of the interests of a broader group of stakeholders. Conyon (2006) analyses the 
development of executive pay in the United States, in the context of the debate between the 
agency model which suggests shareholders (through the compensation committee of the 
board) design executive pay contracts using stock options, restricted stock and long-term 
incentives to motivate CEOs to maximize firm value; and the managerial power view which 




but to maximize CEO reward. Conyon (2006:27) highlights the correlation between CEO pay 
and firm size, stressing that “The notion that all CEOs receive stratospheric sums is 
incorrect.” The distribution of CEO compensation is that a relatively few CEOs of larger 
companies earn vast sums, with the great majority of CEOs in small enterprises earning more 
modest amounts.  
 
While there are a number of explanations for the growth of executive compensation (Kumar 
and Zattoni 2016), including greater risk and incentives, shifts in the managerial labor 
market; changes in board compensation practices; shifts in corporate strategy, technology and 
the business environment; misconceptions about the cost and value of options; as well as 
managerial control of the compensation process; it is hard to escape the conclusion that 
executive compensation is a central part of the problem rather than a solution to corporate 
governance dilemmas. Instead of a land of opportunity, America is becoming typified as a 
land of extreme inequality, with the CEO to worker compensation ratio exploding from 20 to 
1, in the 1960s to 100 to 1 in the 1990s, peaking at 344 to 1 in the tech bubble of 2000, and 
after a short rise and fall before and after the financial crisis returning to 312 to 1 in 2017. 
While this phenomenal growth in CEO reward continued, basic wages stagnated in the US 
for decades and employment security declined (Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2       Executive pay as a multiple of worker pay in the US, 1965–2016 
  




From the 1980s onwards the largest part of executive remuneration in the US has been in 
stock options, meaning the level of executive reward is essentially determined by stock 
prices. Frey and Osterloh (2005) explore the unfortunate implications of this in 
managements’ inclinations to manipulate short term profitability to spike share prices and 
seize exorbitant rewards. In attacking the extreme inequity that has crept into the American 
corporation in the increasingly huge disparity of rewards between CEOs and average wages, 
they conceptualize the corporation as a common pool of firm-specific resources rather than a 
nexus of individual contracts, characterized by a high degree of complex interdependencies 
citing Simon (1991:33): “In general, the greater the interdependence among various members 
of the organization, the more difficult it is to measure their separate contributions to the 
achievement of organizational goals. But of course, intense interdependence is precisely what 
makes it advantageous to organize people instead of depending wholly on market 
transactions.” Frey and Osterloh (2005) argue that high-powered executive incentive systems 
aggravate the problems in the corporate sector encouraging dysfunctional behavior and 
ultimately damaging the firm. 
 
Bebchuk and Fried (2005) agree that managerial influence over compensation schemes have 
weakened managers’ incentives to increase firm value, and created incentives to engage in 
actions that reduce long-term value. They argue that flawed compensation schemes are 
widespread, persistent and systemic in the US and stem from defects in the underlying 
governance structures and call for structural reforms in the allocation of power between 
boards and shareholders. Continuing with this theme, Bebchuk and Jackson (2005) focus on 
opaqueness in the construction of executive pension schemes which lead to distortions of the 
magnitude and make-up of total pay, calling for greater disclosure on an annual basis of the 




part of executive total compensation, and the concealment of large elements of these may 
undermine any effort to link reward to performance. 
 
5.5    CEO Power 
In political models of the firm the interests and beliefs of a dominant coalition preside with 
CEOs exercising formal authority and informal power . Ocasio (1994) examines the political 
dynamics of the executive control over the firm’s coalition reflected in the ability of CEOs to 
retain their positions, putting forward the thesis that contesting coalitions are more likely to 
emerge during periods of poor performance. This model of power builds upon theories of the 
circulation of elites developed by Pareto (1991) and Michels (2001), introduced to 
organizational analysis by Selznick (1957). The concept of a circulation of power indicates 
the impermanence and contestation of executive control over the corporation, contrasting 
with the theory of institutionalization, which emphasizes the power of CEOs to entrench 
themselves, providing two views of the capacity of CEOs to maintain cohesive coalitions 
providing a stable basis for the exercise of power.  
 
In different cultures the evident power of the CEO may not be so great, for example in Japan 
the CEO apparently is not as prominent as in Western companies, however this is not to 
suggest Japanese CEOs have little power, only that there are differences in how Japanese 
CEOs acquire and exercise power (Seki and Clarke 2014) . Slow promotion and job rotation 
provides Japanese managers with the opportunity to acquire expert influence and build 





Bird (1990) recounts how successive promotions legitimate the exercise of power, and CEO 
power is moderated by factors that influence the extent of legitimacy accorded both the 
individual and the office. Bigley and Wiersma (2002) assess the factors influencing whether 
newly appointed CEOs strategic orientation leads them to use their power to maintain the 
status quo or refocus the firm business portfolios. The relative advantages of an internally 
appointed CEO compared to an outside CEO are considered by Georgakakis and Ruigrok 
(2017). Finally, Adams et al (2005) discover that firm performance becomes more variable as 
decision-making power becomes more concentrated in the hands of the CEO, compared to 





A powerful countervailing influence to imperial CEOs is the increasing activity of other 
stakeholders and the new imperatives of responsibility and sustainability. A renewed force 
for stakeholder engagement has developed led by the institutional investors. The dilemma yet 
to be resolved is whether the institutional investors will translate their success in pressing for 
better returns for their investments (Davis 2001), into a wider campaign for greater corporate 
social and environmental responsibility (Davis 2006). The UNEP Financial Initiative is 
indicative of a new commitment to socially responsible investing, which is resonating in the 
corporate sector (World Business Council for Sustainable Development (2014; 2015); World 
Economic Forum (2013; 2014; 2018); Sullivan and Mackenzie (2006). This is creating a 
business context in which corporations are demonstrating greater commitment in the exercise 




has the potential to contribute to redefining corporate values, activities and objectives (Post 
2002; Clarke 2017).   
 
6.1 The Engagement of Institutional Investors    
A new era of institutional investor engagement was recognised by Clark and Hebb (2004) 
bringing together underlying currents in global pension fund investing, that has continued till 
the present day (Klettner et al 2018). This includes the stimulus from investing in the whole 
market index meaning that funds cannot exit, and therefore must find a voice in the firms 
they invest in; the collaboration with the wider corporate governance movement to secure 
greater corporate transparency and accountability; the growing impact of the socially 
responsible investment movement; and the internationalization of social, environmental and 
accounting standards. The corporate engagement by institutions potentially can help anchor 
capital to communities, civilize human resource practices within firms, and encourage 
compliance with labour and environmental standards. If institutional investors are to play an 
increasingly influential role in corporate governance, it is inevitable and proper that the 
institutions’ own governance should come under more critical scrutiny. Useem and Mitchell 
(2000) examine the relationship between the governance structures of pension funds and their 
investment strategies and investment performance. They find that the way public pension 
funds are governed has a direct bearing on how they invest their assets, and the investment 
strategies in turn directly shape financial performance. In the US pension funds are the fastest 
growing institutional investors and by 1999 held forty-two per cent of US corporate equity 
controlled by institutions, which has continued to increase further (Çelik and Isaksson 2014). 
Ryan and Dennis (2003) examine further the complex ethical undertakings and implications 





In contrast Clearfield (2005) concentrates attention on the failure of institutional investors to 
achieve their real potential to exercise governance oversight due to structural factors in the 
governance of the complex investment value chain. For example, the long-term horizon 
involved in many corporate governance initiatives; the different backgrounds, aptitudes and 
incentives of corporate governance specialists, investment managers, and company 
executives; reliance on third party agents; different career paths and competition for 
performance compensation. Greater alignment of governance and investment policies, 
incentives and commitments would lead to better corporate governance outcomes and 
portfolio returns.  
Perhaps the renewed pension fund insistence upon increased transparency not only will align 
managers and owners more effectively, but allow other stakeholders to engage the 
corporation over their concerns, claiming that when organizations are opaque and interests 
are secret, decision making distorts efficiency and equity. 
 
6.2    The Activism of Institutional Investors  
As the influence of institutional investors extends internationally, the direction of the impact 
of their activism becomes more critical. Neubaum and Zahra (2006) pursue in greater detail 
the debate on whether institutional investors are narrowly interested only in maximizing their 
short-term financial performance or are capable of a long term perspective and promoting 
corporate social performance as well as financial performance. Data collected between 1995 
and 2000 for Fortune 500 firms show that long term institutional ownership is positively 
associated with enhanced corporate social performance, and the interaction with long term 




agenda of shareholder activism was partly shaped in the US on issues such as international 
human rights and labour standards, suggest that religious groups helped to  establish the 
legitimacy of the agenda, and mobilized support of investors. From this debate it may be 
concluded that while Anglo-American institutional investors may be influential in Asian and 
European companies in eroding traditional stakeholder relationships in favour of enhancing 
shareholder value, institutional investors with longer term holdings such as pension funds 
may have a positive effect on influencing more responsible management within Anglo-
American markets, and to a degree in the activity of Anglo-American corporations overseas. 
 
The changing pattern of corporate governance activism and influence in Japan is examined 
by Seki (2005; 2019).  Traditionally Japanese corporate governance was characterized by 
cross-shareholdings between banks and client companies organized into conglomerates. The 
executive boards of the companies, composed of present and former managers were oriented 
towards the interests of employees, customers and regulators rather than shareholders. While 
central elements of this pattern of insider governance remain, the changing ownership 
structure with a larger institutional investor representation, particularly from overseas 
institutions, has put new pressures on Japanese boards to deliver shareholder value. The 
implications of this for the good relationships Japanese companies have enjoyed with other 
stakeholders and for the value system sustaining this are presently contested (Buchanan e al 
2014; Seki and Clarke 2015; Yoshikawa 2018). 
 
6.3    Governance and Employees  
The interests of employees are conventionally excluded from discussion of contemporary 




suggestion is often made that the pursuit of shareholder value will inevitably serve the 
interests of other stakeholders as value creation requires the engagement of all stakeholders 
(Blair and Roe 1999; Clarke 1998). The problematic nature of this assumption is experienced 
in high relief in countries such as Japan where employees’ interests have traditionally been 
foremost in company orientations (Learmont 2002; Jacoby 2004). Takeshi (2001) 
investigates the implications of the corporate governance reforms in Japan in terms of the 
movement from a pluralist model of corporate governance where the objective of the firm is 
to realize all stakeholder interests, to an enlightened shareholder value model to pursue 
shareholder value by engaging stakeholders in accomplishing this objective. Though 
Japanese employers insist they remain committed to a pluralist approach, there is evidence 
they are increasingly pursuing enlightened shareholder value in eroding the employment 
seniority system, widening wage differentials, diversifying wages systems, and undermining 
working conditions (Seki and Clarke 2014).  
 
Blair (1999) takes issue with the property rights view of the firm as a bundle of assets 
belonging to shareholders and managed by their hired agents. An alternative view of the firm 
is that the relationships among the people who participate in productive activity are at the 
heart of the definition of the firm. The contractarian view treats the firm as a network of 
contracts yet focuses almost entirely on the relationship between shareholders and managers. 
Blair (1999:58) insists that contractarian views need to recognize multilateral and 
multidimensional relationships and agreements among individuals are possible only when it 
is acknowledged that “a corporation is a separate entity, and more than the sum of its parts 
…something that cannot protect itself through contract, but that needs to be protected by 





The contrast between the absence of a role for workers in Anglo-American interpretations of 
corporate governance and the increasing role that workers’ pension funds have as 
shareholders is considered by O’Connor (2000), who examines ways of bringing activity 
around workers concerns regarding job insecurity, wage inequality, pension fund governance 
and investment strategies into closer alignment (Clarke 1978). A different picture of 
corporate governance in Europe is revealed by Goodijk (2000) who discusses how the Works 
Council (composed of employees) and Supervisory Board (composed of employee and 
shareholder representatives) exist and could play a fuller role in strategic decision making in 
Dutch companies. European managers have in the past been skilled at stakeholder dialogue as 
the means to achieve the commitment to change and new strategies; however this could be 
lost if the newer shareholder-oriented governance models are uncritically accepted. In the 
context of the continuing changes in corporate governance in Japan Araki (2005) suggests 
though the employee-centred governance model is under threat there from successive waves 
of new shareholder-oriented governance reforms, there is evidence that what has occurred so 




7. Globalisation and Convergence 
7.1    Different Corporate Governance Systems  
Different approaches to financing corporations in different regions of the world have 




and Jackson 2007). The evolution of the corporate form can be traced from the family and 
closely held capitalism of the early 19th century with the protection of ownership rights; 
through to the managerial capitalism of the early 20th century with further protection for 
listed corporations and limited liability; and finally, the popular capitalism of the late 20th 
century with protection of minority interests and mass ownership. However, different routes 
were followed in this evolution and different destinations reached in corporate practice, 
company law, and associated institutional development of Anglo-American, European and 
Asian forms of corporate enterprise. In the Asian system of corporate governance stronger 
elements of family ownership survive intact, and in the European system more managerial 
forms have survived.  
 7.2    Convergence or Parallel Universes? 
The result is two parallel universes of corporate governance: a dispersed ownership model 
characterized by strong and liquid securities markets, high disclosure standards, high market 
transparency, and where the market for corporate control is the ultimate disciplining 
mechanism; and secondly a concentrated ownership model characterized by controlling 
shareholders, weak securities markets, low transparency and disclosure standards and often a 
central monitoring role for large banks who have a stake in the company (Coffee 2000; 
Clarke 2005). The dispersed ownership (market based, Anglo-American corporate 
governance systems) and the concentrated ownership (European and Asian relationship based 
corporate governance systems) are described by a variety of names that reflect their different 
characteristics: including market systems and block-holder systems, rules based and 
relationship based systems, and market and bank based systems. However, the simplest 





Outsider systems are typified by dispersed ownership, a clear separation of ownership and 
control, lower debt/equity ratios, and sophisticated financial markets. In this system, there is 
less incentive for outsiders to participate in the control of the corporation, except insofar as 
they do so through the equity markets, and the severest sanction is hostile takeover. The 
interests of outside stakeholders are not formally represented, and investors themselves often 
have less interest in the strategic goals of the enterprise than in the short term returns that are 
available. In contrast, insider systems are typified by highly concentrated ownership which is 
closely connected with the managerial control of the enterprise, and high debt/equity ratios, 
with a higher rate of bank credits due to the closer relationship with banks that are often 
represented on the board of major corporations along with other stakeholders including 
related firms and employees. In these systems hostile takeovers rarely, if ever, occur and 
there is often a dense network of supportive relationships with related businesses that 
occasionally can develop into collusion.  
 
Intense debate over recent decades has concerned the relative merits of the different corporate 
governance systems, often with the assumption that the Anglo-American system with 
stronger security markets and higher levels of disclosure represents a more advanced and 
efficient mode of corporate finance and governance, and leading to the conclusion that 
inevitably there will be either an early, or more gradual, shift of the European and Asian 
systems of corporate governance towards the Anglo-American model (Hansmann and 
Kraakerman 2001; McCahery et al 2002; Hamilton and Quinlan 2005). However, the 
argument for inevitable convergence has tended to underestimate the extent of the different 
orientations and objectives of the alternative systems; the different institutional 
complementarities that have evolved; and failed to appreciate the significance of different 




regions of the world there are deeply embedded differences regarding business values and 
ways of doing things, and very different relationships with stakeholders. There exist 
profoundly contrasting beliefs in the role of the market in the different systems, which 
influence the way the corporation is considered: simply as a bundle of tradable assets in the 
worst-case scenario of the market-based system; but as a productive institution to be passed 
on to future generations in the best-case of the insider governance system. As a result, 
different measures of performance are applied, with the market-based system looking for 
short term returns, and the European and Japanese systems having much longer-term 
horizons.  
 
As a consequence of the differences in corporate governance structure and objectives, the 
different systems demonstrate unique strengths and weaknesses: essentially, they are good at 
doing different things, and they all have weaknesses (Moerland 1995; Dore et al. 2002). The 
Anglo-American governance system supports a dynamic market orientation, with fluid 
capital which can quickly chase market opportunities wherever they occur. This agility and 
speed equipped the United States to capitalize on the new economy of electronics, software, 
media, financial and professional services: an industrial resurgence that reasserted the US 
global economic ascendancy. The downside of this system is the corollary of its strength: the 
inherent volatility, short termism and inadequate governance procedures that often left US 
manufacturing industry stranded and caused periodic stock market panics and occasional 
crashes that left the least well informed investors with crippling losses (Clarke 2017). A 
weaker and often disoriented public sector was another casualty of Anglo-American 





In marked contrast European enterprise as typified by the German governance system 
traditionally has committed to a long-term industrial strategy supported by stable capital 
investment and robust governance procedures that build enduring relationships with key 
stakeholders (Clarke and Bostock 1997; Cernat 2004; Lane 2003). This was the foundation of 
the German economic miracle which carried the country forward to becoming the leading 
exporter in the world of products renowned for their quality and reliability including luxury 
automobiles, precision instruments, chemicals, and electrical engineering. Again, the 
weaknesses of the German system were the corollary of its strengths: the depth of 
relationships leading to a lack of flexibility, that made it difficult to pursue initiatives for new 
businesses and industries while accumulating costs in established companies, resulting in 
high unemployment. The Latin variant of European corporate governance as practiced in 
France and Italy is highly network oriented, with dominant holdings by the state, families, or 
industrial groups. Ownership concentration provides for stability and long-term horizons, 
with strong relationships with stakeholders. This governance system has allowed the 
Southern European countries to specialize and enhance their skills in selected industries with 
notable success, for example in France aerospace and luxury goods, and in Italy fashion and 
design goods (Goyer 2001). However, in Southern Europe often weak governance 
accountability and frequent network and pyramid control diminishes the integrity of the 
equity market: the strength of the block-holder relationships precluding others from 
becoming involved.  
 
Finally, the Asian corporate governance system is the most network based of all, with the 
firm as the institutional centre of long enduring and deep economic relationships of investors, 
employees, suppliers and customers (Claessens and Fan 2002). In the Japanese system there 




longest investment horizons of all and was the key to the Japanese success in progressively 
dominating overseas markets in the US and Europe in electronic consumer goods and 
automobiles. The Japanese economic miracle came to an abrupt end when paying the price 
for its own success, the hugely speculative bubble burst in the early 1990s, the resulting 
decades-long disorientation revealing the weaknesses of secretive and unaccountable 
Japanese governance. However, the rest of the Asia Pacific is increasingly emulating the 
success of the Japanese in pursuing innovation in a knowledge economy, the centre of gravity 
of world manufacturing has moved East, while there remain doubts regarding the strength of 
governance institutions there to sustain progress (Yoshikawa 2018; Clarke and Lee 2018). 
 
7.3    Globalisation of Corporate Governance    
The current phase of globalization represents a profound reconfiguration of the world 
economy compared to earlier periods of internationalization. “An international economy links 
distinct national markets; a global economy fuses national markets into a coherent whole” 
(Kobrin 2002: 7). Early civilizations traded goods and services across vast regions, often 
forcefully, and more recently internationalization was formalized with the seizure of the 
colonies reaching a high-water mark in the years before the First World War (Petrella 1996: 
63; Hirst and Thompson 1996: 2). After the dislocation and protectionism resulting from two 
world wars, the recovery and resurgence of international trade and foreign direct investment 
from the 1950s was fuelled by the growth of multinational firms involving the transfer of 
capital and production overseas. The impact of the multinational corporations, as they have 
driven the process of globalization, has proved substantial and pervasive, and the activities of 
these imposing corporations developing vast global value chains have become synonymous 





As the growth of foreign direct investment exceeded the growth in world trade, the centrality 
of corporations’ internationalization strategies to the evolving pattern of the industrial and 
investment processes of globalization became increasingly apparent, as the OECD 
acknowledged: 
 
“Globalization of industry refers to an evolving pattern of cross-border activities of firms 
involving international investment, trade and collaboration for purposes of product 
development, production and sourcing, and marketing. These international activities enable 
firms to enter new markets, exploit their technological and organizational advantages, and 
reduce business costs and risks. Underlying the international expansion of firms, and in part 
driven by it, are technological advances, the liberalization of markets and increased mobility 
of production factors. These complex patterns of cross border activities increasingly 
characterise the international economic system and distinguish it from the earlier 
predominance of arms-length trade in finished goods” (OECD 1996: 9). 
 
Different corporate governance systems perform these duties in the context of the enveloping 
challenges of competitive globalization. There are many interrelationships between the 
strengths and weaknesses of different approaches to corporate governance and the ensuing 
achievements and problems of globalization. If multinational corporations can identify with 
their contribution to the expansion of the global economy, they have to recognize in turn their 
involvement in the wider dilemmas and tragedies of globalization. The fact that globalization 




disagreements concerning the perception of the interests globalization primarily serves, the 
processes involved, and the consequences that result. 
 
The key characteristics of globalization contributing to this unequal transformation of the 
world economy include the liberalization of international trade; expansion of foreign direct 
investment; emergence of massive cross-border financial flows; increased competition in 
global markets; policy decisions to reduce national barriers to international economic 
transactions; impact of new technology, especially in the sphere of information and 
communications; the acceleration of global environmental degradation; and the social impact 
of globalization in compounding inequality. It is when these economic, finance, technology, 
environmental, and social conditions are taken together that the combustible elements of 
contemporary globalization are fully realized: 
“The effects of the new technology have given a distinctive character to the current process 
of globalization, as compared to similar episodes in the past. The natural barriers of time and 
space have been vastly reduced. The cost of moving information, people, goods and capital 
across the globe has fallen dramatically, while global communication is cheap and 
instantaneous and becoming ever more so. This has vastly expanded the feasibility of 
economic transactions across the world. Markets can now be global in scope and encompass 
an expanding range of goods and services” (World Commission 2004:24). 
 
7.4    Technological Transformation 
The advance of global production, networking and communicating technologies has been 
critical to the task of pushing forward economic and financial global integration. These three 




domestic markets and governance problematic. The scale of technology in many strategic 
industries (its cost, risk and complexity) renders the minimal effective market size to achieve 
a return on investment larger than that of even the largest national markets, pressing 
corporations to expand their activities overseas. Networks are replacing hierarchies and 
markets as a basic form of economic organization. The distributed and relational character of 
networks is not consistent with economic authority exercised through bounded and discrete 
geographic territory. The migration of markets and economic activity to cyberspace (or some 
combination of physical and virtual space) renders geographic space problematic as a basis 
for effective economic governance (Kobrin 2002: 2). Despite the recent dematerialization of 
much productive activity and its relocation to cyberspace, the cumulative effect of advancing 
globalization on the physical environment also has to be reckoned with. 
 
7.5   The Impact of Multinational Enterprises   
If nation states were written out of the script of globalization far too early, the other great 
player in the globalization saga are the multi-national enterprises that are often assumed to be 
in the lead role. This view is encouraged by the prominence multinational enterprises now 
enjoy in the public consciousness largely due to the vast sums spent on advertising and 
marketing their brand images. Disparaging comparisons are often made between the rapidly 
growing revenues and market capitalization of multinational enterprises, and the more halting 
growth of the economies of many nation states, with the implication the largest global 
corporations are becoming more significant economic entities than most nation states.  
 
The autonomy and power of multinational enterprises relative to national states has often 




economic significance of multinational enterprises, and as Calder and Culverwell (2005: 16) 
argue the increasing involvement of these corporations in the economies of developing 
countries is one of the main concerns in recent globalization debates. The sales of the largest 
100 multinationals increased from $3.2 trillion to $4.8 trillion between 1990 and 2000 
(UNCTAD 2002: 90). By 2017 Fortune claimed the 500 largest multinational companies 
were generating $30 trillion in revenues, and $1.9 trillion in profits. Foreign employment by 
multinational enterprises grew from 24 million people in 1990 to 54 million people in 2001 
(UNCTAD 2002: xv). During this period private sector corporations commenced the 
operation and construction of approximately 2,500 infrastructure projects in developing 
countries with a total investment of $750 billion (World Bank 2002: 1). More recently China 
has responded with a huge geopolitical and economic strategy of its own in the Belt and Road 
Initiative, that seeks to establish infrastructural pathways and industry links with all of South 
Asia and Western Asia all the way to Eastern Europe (Cai 2017). Whatever economic 
benefits might flow from these international projects, they are often shrouded in weak 
governance and accountability, with poor social and environmental outcomes: 
 
“Weak public sector governance in some developing countries has meant that transnational 
corporations (TNCs) are often operating in areas with far weaker environmental and social 
standards than those in their ‘home’ countries, where human rights are being abused and/or 
where corruption is endemic. These conditions have been seen to create the risk that the 
activities of TNCs in these countries will lead to negative environmental and/or social 





There have been a number of initiatives from the UN, World Bank and OECD to address 
these issues, including the OECD (2008; 2018) Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 
offering detailed guidance on good business conduct regarding human rights, accountability, 
disclosure, employment, environmental protection, bribery and taxation. Though these 
guidelines are a comprehensive statement on internationally agreed principles, they fail to 
provide sufficient detail on key issues such as the provision of a living wage, human rights 
and tax compliance; the guidelines do not directly apply to small and medium sized 
enterprises; and their applicability to global supply chains is contested (Calder and 
Culverwell 2005: 46). 
 
7.6      The Global Value Chain 
As global corporations have developed, they have transformed their structure and operations 
immensely, distributing the supply of materials and components, and the assembly of finished 
products, throughout the emerging economies but with a focus on the Asia Pacific, while 
retaining firm control of finance, innovation, design, and marketing in their national 
headquarters (Clarke and Boersma 2019). The implications of the global value chain for 
corporate governance are profound and multi-dimensional in terms of control, accountability 
and taxation. Paradoxically they have disaggregated their operations while simultaneously 
centralizing and concentrating their control of essential and high value-added functions. The 
continuing advance of global value chains as the contemporary mode of production by 
corporations for an increasing number of goods and services has impacted considerably on 
the economies and societies of both the developed world and the emerging economies 





The OECD suggests the global value chain manifests the increasing fragmentation of 
production across countries, the specialization of countries in tasks and business functions 
rather than specific products, and the role of networks of global buyers and global suppliers: 
“This international fragmentation of production is a powerful source of increased efficiency 
and firm competitiveness. Today, more than half of world manufactured imports are 
intermediate goods (primary goods, parts and components, and semi-finished products), and 
more than 70 percent of world services imports are intermediate services” (OECD 2012: 7, 4; 
OECD 2013). 
 
7.7    Globalization of Capital Markets   
Greater still than the impact of the multinational enterprises and the global value chain upon 
the globalizing economy, has been the explosive growth of the international financial system, 
which has fuelled the processes of globalisation, that have often appeared to dwarf domestic 
economies. An important component of this financialization of the world economy is the 
growth of capital markets, and the vast growth of equity markets from 1990 to 2018.  In this 
relatively short period the American zone equity markets (entirely dominated by the NYSE 
and Nasdaq) were propelled from a total of 4,000 billion dollars to 40,294 billion dollars in 
2018. The European zone markets grew from just over 2,000 billion dollars in 1990 to 18,815 
billion in 2018, while market capitalization in the Asia Pacific zone grew from just under 
4,000 billion in 1990 to 26,395 billion dollars in 2018 (World Federation of Exchanges 
2018a).  
 





The World Bank \ highlights the exponential growth of the market capitalisation of listed 
corporations reaching nearly US 80 trillion by 2017 (Figure 3). Due to the scale and intensity 
of the volume of share trading internationally the value of global equity trading worldwide far 
exceeds the total market capitalisation of companies (WFE 2018). Translated into billions of 
equity exchange traded derivatives contracts the hundreds of trillions of dollars traded on 
global financial markets ultimately based on listed entities activity becomes truly startling 
(WFE 2018). While this is rationalised by financial institutions as the provision of liquidity 
and flexibility in capital markets, it is also a cause of recurrent profound instability in world 




8. Crisis and Regulation  
8.1    Introduction: Cycles of Crisis and Reform 
Corporate governance crisis and reform is essentially cyclical (Clarke 2004). Waves of 
corporate governance reform and increased regulation occur during periods of recession, 
corporate collapse and re-examination of the viability of regulatory systems. During long 
periods of expansion, active interest in governance diminishes, as companies and 
shareholders become again more concerned with the generation of wealth, than in its 
retention. This cyclical pattern of stock market booms encouraging and concealing corporate 
excesses undoubtedly will continue (Clarke 2010).  
 
When crisis and recession highlight corporate failings, statutory intervention invariably 




particularly in times of expansion. There will never be a ‘perfect’ system of corporate 
governance. Market systems are competitive and volatile and dynamic systems of governance 
will reflect this. But corporate governance is about risk-management. The drive to make 
corporate governance both improve corporate performance and enhance corporate 
accountability will continue. 
 
All of the different regional corporate governance systems, even apparently the most 
successful, have experienced recurrent periods of crisis that have exposed their structural 
weaknesses. For example, for decades in the 1970s to the present day the World Bank and 
other international institutions have celebrated the rapid economic growth of the Tiger 
economies of the Asia Pacific (World Bank 1993; 2018; Mason and Shetty 2019).  Yet, 
following the 1997/98 Asian financial crisis, the weak finance and governance institutions of 
the Asia Pacific were highlighted (Clarke 2000). Just as the OECD, World Bank and IMF 
were increasingly confidently projecting the Anglo-American market-based outsider system 
of governance as the pre-eminent model from which all other countries might learn, the 
Enron disaster occurred. The corrosive greed that became an integral part of the incentive 
system in US corporate governance yielded a more sinister fruit in the protracted spate of 
corporate frauds and bankruptcies of 2001/2002. 
 
  8.2   Enron and WorldCom bankruptcy and the collapse of the Nasdaq 2001/2002 
  
Bubbles have permeated stock markets from their beginnings, but the vast scale of 
unprecedented US stock market bubbles in 2001 and again in 2007 is hard to imagine: 
“American stock price behaviour at the turn of the millennium had all the characteristics 




January 1980 and August 2000 American stock prices as measured by the S&P500 index 
rose by 1239 per cent; over the same period the dividends on the shares underlying the 
index rose by only 188 per cent, while the earnings rose by 254 per cent” (Brennan 2004: 
1). The precipitous rise of share prices was followed by a calamitous fall: “In the period 
2000–2002 the New York market suffered the biggest stock market crash in US history 
compared with GNP. Since early 2000 when it peaked at $15,000 billion, market 
capitalisation fell by $7,000 billion i.e. 46 per cent, and those who invested at the top of 
the market lost half of their investments” (Taylor 2003:158; The Economist, 7 September 
2002). 
 
Leading corporations at the head of the new economy lost more than half their market 
value during this period including Microsoft, Cisco and Intel, many smaller new 
technology companies came close to bankruptcy, and even established corporations such 
as General Electric and Pfizer lost 40 per cent of their market capitalization. (Financial 
Times 17 November 2005). 
 
The apparently dynamic, competitive and performance-oriented US economy of the 
1990s degenerated over time as executives, faced with the necessity to demonstrate ever 
increasing returns, resorted to illegal means to do so (Boyer 2005). Creative accounting 
and a, sometimes criminal, collusion between executives, auditors and analysts inflated a 
speculative bubble that finally burst, but not before many executives had cashed in their 
options, leaving their own employees destitute and superannuation funds depleted around 
the world. The Chairman of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, William J. 
McDonagh, speaking at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, graphically exposed the 





“For 10 years, the United States enjoyed the longest economic expansion in the country’s 
history. What could go wrong? Morality went wrong. In the mid-1990s, it became 
fashionable for companies in America to guide allegedly independent investment analysts 
to a view of the company’s forthcoming quarterly earnings. We know that all numbers on 
a financial statement are estimates, including cash if the company operates in more than 
one currency. As a result, there is a certain amount of room for those estimates to be 
shaded to make the forecast. And then it became fashionable to expect and forecast ever-
rising earnings, meaning, essentially, that product cycles and unexpected shocks and even 
the law of gravity no longer applied. It was a formula for cooking the books – and the 
books got cooked. There was another motive to cook the books. If earnings are good and 
always moving upward, the equity market loves it, and the stock multiple improves. That 
is really great if you are a senior executive, and your remuneration is related to the stock 
price. And that was the case. In 1993, the U.S. Congress passed a law limiting the 
expensing for tax purposes of the remuneration of any individual to $1 million per year, 
unless that remuneration is incentive-based. That law was the fairy godmother of stock 
options, which of course are incentive-based. And total remuneration grew spectacularly: 
in 1980, the average CEO of a Fortune 500 company made 40 times more than the 
average employee of the company. By 2000, that multiple had leaped by a factor of 10 to 
400 times. I find it grotesquely immoral – explainable by no economic theory or principle 
other than greed” (2005:1). 
 
   8.3    International weaknesses in governance 
While the cyclical nature of market booms and busts is much more pronounced in the Anglo-




the world. Both the European and Asian forms of corporate governance have experienced 
some acute difficulties. Though Europeans have not witnessed anything quite as catastrophic 
as the corporate collapses in the US, there have periodically been disasters, for example the 
Parmalat debacle which revealed a leading Italian listed company had been used as personal 
property by its chief executive for many years, without detection or accountability. There are 
continuing doubts concerning the close network relationships that did typify much of 
European enterprise, and that often still exist (IFC 2015; Clarke and Chanlat 2009).  
 
In the Asia-Pacific the miracle tiger economies stalled in the Asian Financial Crisis of 
1987/98 in which a speculative frenzy, with inadequate financial controls, led to the collapse 
of stock markets, currencies and financial institutions (Clarke 2000). Though an export led 
recovery rescued the growth of the East Asian economies, systemic weaknesses remained 
apparent in Asian modes of governance, where the separation of ownership and control has 
not taken hold:  
“In all East Asian countries control is enhanced through pyramid structures and cross-
holdings, among firms. Voting rights consequently exceed formal cash flow rights, especially 
in Indonesia, Japan and Singapore. We find that more than two thirds of firms are controlled 
by a single shareholder. Separation of management from ownership control is rare, and the 
top management of about 60 per cent of firms that are not widely held is related to the family 
of controlling shareholder” (Claessens et al 2000:82).  
 
Empirical research by Claessens et al 2000) revealed countries in Asia with a higher 
concentration of ownership of companies among a few families or block-holders showed the 




frequently associated with a neglect of minority shareholder rights, as legal and judicial 
systems are not developed or active, and widespread corruption was often tolerated. (As 
illustrated in even the most successful economies of Asia as in recent scandals at Samsung in 
Korea, and Nissan and Olympus in Japan). After a long passage of reforms over two decades 
there is greater proficiency in the fundamentals of corporate governance in many countries of 
Asia (OECD 2017a), however in China the urge to adopt international standards of 
accountability has been tempered by the universal presence of state and party influence 
(ACGA 2018). These insecure and unstable political, financial and governance institutions 
could prove the cause of further crises in future. 
 
8.4   The Global Financial Crisis 2007/2008 
The Global Financial Crisis exposed the deepening instability of Anglo-American economies, 
and how recurrent crises are connected to profound structural and institutional weaknesses in 
the system. The US Federal Reserve under Alan Greenspan had responded to the collapse of 
confidence caused by the Nasdaq disaster and Enron/WorldCom failures in 2001/2002 by 
reducing US interest rates to 1 per cent, their lowest in 45 years, flooding the market with 
cheap credit to jump-start the economy back into life. US business did recover faster than 
expected, but the cheap credit had washed into the financial services and housing sectors 
producing the largest speculative bubbles ever witnessed in the American economy 
(Fleckenstein 2008). The scene was set by the 1999 dismantling of the 1932 Glass–Steagall 
Act which had separated commercial banking from investment banking and insurance 
services, opening the way for a consolidation of the vastly expanding and increasingly 
competitive US financial services industry. Phillips (2008: 5) describes this as a “burgeoning 





As the new financial derivatives were developed and marketed, the securities markets grew 
massively in the 2000s dwarfing the growth of the real economy. For example, according to 
the Bank of International Settlements, the global derivatives markets grew at the rate of 32 
per cent per annum from 1990, and the notional amount of derivatives reached $106 trillion 
by 2002, $477 trillion by 2006, and exceeded $531 trillion by 2008 (though gross market 
value is a small fraction of this) (McKinsey & Company 2008: 20). The supposed purpose of 
this increasingly massive exercise was to hedge risk and add liquidity to the financial system.  
 
The prolonged systemic crisis in international financial markets commencing in 2007 was 
also a crisis in corporate governance and regulation. The apparent ascendancy of Anglo-
American markets and governance institutions was profoundly questioned by the scale and 
contagion of the global financial crisis. Instead of risk being hedged, it had become 
interconnected, international and unknown. The market capitalization of the stock markets of 
the world had peaked at $62 trillion at the end of 2007. By October 2008 they were in free 
fall, having lost $33 trillion, over half of their value, in 12 months of unrelenting financial 
and corporate failures, climaxing in the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the largest bankruptcy 
in history (Clarke 2020). 
 
The most severe financial disaster since the Great Depression of the 1930s exposed the 
dangers of unregulated financial markets and nominal corporate governance. The crisis 
originated in Wall Street, where deregulation unleashed highly incentivized investment banks 
to flood world markets with toxic financial products. As a stunning series of banks and 
investment companies collapsed in the US and then in Europe, a frightening dimension of the 
global economy became fully apparent: a new world disorder of violently volatile markets 




ascendancy of Anglo-American markets and governance institutions was profoundly 
questioned by the scale and contagion of the 2008 global financial crisis, as Joseph Stiglitz 
(2008:37) stated: “America’s financial institutions have not managed risk; they have created 
it.” 
 
8.5    Post-Crisis Reform of Corporate Governance 
The worldwide commitment towards improving standards of corporate governance has 
encompassed a succession of legislative changes to company law, beginning with the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 in the US, and progressive legal reform has occurred in almost all 
jurisdictions. This has been supported by the national corporate governance codes introduced 
in many countries. Reinforcing the effort to achieve substantial reform, the international 
agencies – especially the OECD, World Bank and Asian Development Bank – have 
maintained a constant drive towards the adoption of more rules based corporate governance 
systems. This culminated in the publication of the OECD Principles of Corporate 
Governance in 1999, revised in 2004 in the light of the post-Enron lessons, and later further 
revised with the support of the G20 in 2015 following the global financial crisis. A growing 
number of corporate governance ratings agencies have monitored changes at both corporate 
and national levels (OECD 2017b).  
 
However diligent the process of corporate governance reform was in the Anglo-American 
economies in the post-Enron period of 2002–2007, and whatever the respective merits of the 
US black letter law approach as in Sarbanes–Oxley, or the principles-based approach as in 
the UK Combined Code, nothing prepared the US or UK regulators, boards, lawyers or 
accountants, or executives themselves for the sudden and dramatic onslaught of the global 




regulation, governance and risk management and brought the international economy teetering 
to the brink of complete collapse.  
 
While the accumulated vast cost of the global financial crisis was being realized the 
commitment to establish a new international financial regulatory framework increased 
(Clarke and Klettner 2011). The costs of all forms of intervention to alleviate the crisis by the 
US government ballooned out to $7.7 trillion.  These costs included credit discounts, credit 
extensions, securities lending, term auction facilities, portfolio funding, money market 
funding, Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), assistance to specific institutions, economic 
stimulus packages and homeowner assistance. The general market assistance and specific 
rescue packages for individual financial institutions amounted to over ten trillion dollars 
worldwide by October 2008. Though these funds could be regarded as a temporary 
investment in the financial economy, with the hope of recouping most of the funds back at a 




There was a widespread sense that this regulatory failure of financial markets could not be 
allowed to occur again. A problem in devising a new financial regulatory architecture was 
that Bretton Woods in 1944, though it established the International Monetary Fund and 
World Bank, was essentially dealing with national financial markets. Digital and 
interconnected global financial markets presented a much bigger challenge. The International 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) was tasked with the job of translating the 
reform principles of the G20 into a regulatory architecture that might transform the 




measures, developed by the BCBS to strengthen the regulation, supervision and risk 
management of the banking sector. These measures were aimed to: 
• improve the banking sector’s ability to absorb shocks arising from financial and 
economic stress, whatever the source;  
• improve risk management and governance; and  
• strengthen banks’ transparency and disclosures. 
This reform effort is substantial and real, yet when the Basel III guidelines were released in 
2010 there was great expectation regarding their implementation in 2013, over time this 
commitment has diminished as business-as-usual practices are reasserted. The lobbyists for 
US banks asserted that their institutions were already raising their holdings of liquid assets, 
and implementation time-lines were relaxed, meaning that final global implementation only 
occurred fully by 2019. Critics are concerned that there is no restraint on banks to hold 
capital against some high-risk assets, and though it may be more costly for banks to engage in 
high-risk behavior, they are still able to this. 
 
If the delay in the implementation of the Basel III reforms was disappointing, the protracted 
stripping away of the legislative intent and regulatory traction of the Dodd–Frank Act is a 
much greater tragedy. The Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
after prolonged legislative battles was finally passed by the Obama administration in 2010, as 
a bulwark against the excesses that led to the global financial crisis. The question arises 
whether this massive swathe of legislation, however well intentioned, once denuded of much 
of the intended impact by the well-funded Wall Street lobbyists in Washington, will have the 
intended effect. The global financial crisis and its aftermath consisted of multiple and 
compounding failures in financial markets, institutions, regulation and governance. The 




taking and leverage, and the abandonment of effective governance and ethical commitments 
occurred in a regulatory vacuum (Akerlof and Shiller 2009). Governments were convinced 
that lightening the burden of regulation was the means to promote more dynamic financial 
markets and business development. The realization of the consequences of unchecked 
systemic risks has prompted national governments and international agencies into a major 
series of regulatory reforms and interventions in financial markets and institutions, the effect 
of which remains to be discerned.  
 
The Wall Street banks are now larger and more remote than before, continue business as 
usual, and have not fundamentally changed their behavior, leading Elizabeth Warren, the 
campaigning US Senator, to call for a twenty-first century Glass–Steagall Act, to ‘ensure they 
[the banks] are not too big to fail – or, for that matter, too big to manage, too big to regulate, 
too big for trial, or too big for jail’ (Warren 2017).  
 
There is a profound paradox that after two decades of corporate governance reform, 
governments and corporations remain fully engaged in the governance challenges posed by 
the transformation of markets, operations and technologies in the finance sector. As one 
authority stated, “We have not yet fully understood the causes of the last financial crisis and 
have not begun to prepare for the next one.”  
 
The belief that the considerable efforts by government to rescue and reform financial 
institutions and markets would lead to sustained stability and security in the sector was rudely 
dispelled in a prolonged sequence of bank scandals and market failures in the years following 
the financial crisis. The banking crisis segued into a sovereign debt crisis in Southern Europe 




seismic eruptions in the mainstream financial institutions with the revelations surrounding the 
London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) rate fixing. A total of $10 trillion in loans and $350 
trillion in derivatives worldwide were indexed to LIBOR. As the US Financial Stability 
Oversight Council (established by the Dodd–Frank Act to identify risks to financial stability, 
promote market discipline and respond to emerging threats) highlighted: 
“Recent investigations uncovered systemic false reporting and manipulations of 
reference rate submissions dating back many years. This misconduct was designed to 
either increase the potential profit of the submitting firms or to convey a misleading 
picture of the relative health of the submitting banks. These actions were pervasive, 
occurred in multiple bank locations around the world, involved senior bank officials at 
several banks, and affected multiple benchmark rates and currencies, including 
LIBOR, EURIBOR, and the Tokyo Interbank Offered Rate (TIBOR). Each of the 
banks that faced charges engaged in a multi-year pattern of misconduct that involved 
collusion with other banks” (G20 FSB 2013: 137). 
 
This rate manipulation predated the 2008 financial crisis and had continued long after the 
government support and intervention in the banking sector following the financial crisis, 
revealing how constricted any ostensible change in governance and ethics within the banks 
actually was. After a major inquiry into Barclays’ involvement in the LIBOR rate-rigging, 
and subpoenas to JP Morgan, Deutsche Bank, Royal Bank of Scotland Group, HSBC, 
Citigroup and UBS, all of the banks settled for fines amounting to billions of dollars with the 
Department of Justice and Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) in the United 







9. Corporate Responsibility and Corporate Sustainability                                                         
 
9.1    The Licence to Operate 
Since the origins of industrial capitalism corporations have wrestled with the dilemma of 
whether their sole purpose is to generate wealth (narrowly defined as financial profit) or 
whether corporations have broader obligations to the communities in which they are situated, 
and from which they derive not only their fundamental resources (employees, materials, 
customers) but their license to operate – that is their legitimacy. Bridging the divide between 
corporate governance and corporate social responsibility has proved a great challenge to 
managers for generations (Benn and Dunphy 2007; Clarke 2015a). 
 
Increasingly today the social and environmental impact of the corporation will be assessed in 
deciding whether the corporation is viable or not, by governments, regulators, investors and 
other stakeholders, even if the corporations’ management are reluctant themselves to make 
this assessment. The licence to operate can no longer be readily assumed for any corporation, 
and in an increasing number of economic, industrial, and social contexts needs to be earned 
with verifiable evidence of the social and environmental responsibility of the corporation 
(Clarke 2015b). 
 
     9.2    Defining Corporate Social Responsibility 
Definitions of CSR and sustainability have evolved over time and range from the basic to the 
most demanding, from a specific reference to a number of necessary activities to demonstrate 
responsibility, to a general call for a comprehensive, integrated and committed pursuit of 




massive problem around terminology,” argues Jane Nelson (EIU 2008a: 6), director of the 
Corporate Social Responsibility Initiative at Harvard University. Even when two companies 
use the same term, “one of them might be looking at corporate responsibility much more 
from a supply-chain management, managing risks, human rights perspective” whereas 
another might be thinking, “how do we make money out of this?”’ (EIU 2008a: 6). 
Undoubtedly CSR has matured over recent decades, driven by evolving global guidelines, 
national regulations, increased stakeholder expectations and more demanding corporate 
disclosure requirements, together with widespread voluntary initiatives by corporations to 
embed CSR into their core business. Yet as Jane Nelson insists what is presently happening 
lacks the speed and scale to bring about the systemic change required to remedy increasing 
social and environmental dilemmas: 
“The negative headlines persist, fuelled by reports of sweat-shops in low-income countries 
producing cheap goods for OECD markets, fatal tragedies such as the collapse of the Rana 
Plaza garment factory in Bangladesh in 2013 and the Turkish mining disaster in 2014, and 
catastrophic environmental accidents. Moreover, the legacy of the global financial crisis, 
concerns about corporate tax practices and challenges such as youth unemployment and 
climate change have forced corporations to lift their sights further above the bottom line and 
to judge their performance against wider social goals.” (Nelson 2014). 
 
The following are some definitions of corporate social responsibility, each of which have 
different emphases: 
• The integration of stakeholders’ social, environmental and other concerns into a company’s 




• The commitment of businesses to contribute to sustainable economic development by 
working with their employees, their families, the local community and society at large to 
improve their lives in ways which are good for business and for development (World 
Business Council for Sustainable Development 2002).  
• Corporate social responsibility is at heart a process of managing the costs and benefits of 
business activity to both internal (for example, workers, shareholders, investors) and external 
(institutions of public governance, community members, civil society groups, other 
enterprises) stakeholders. Setting the boundaries for how those costs and benefits are 
managed is partly a question of business policy and strategy and partly a question of public 
governance (World Bank 2002a: 1). 
 
Sustainability as a whole, (planet, environment, species), is an altogether more ambitious 
project with more expansive definitions than CSR, as sustainability is focused on more 
fundamental problems. “All economic activity occurs in the natural, physical world. 
Economic activities require resources such as energy, materials, and land. Further, economic 
activity invariably generates material residuals, which enter the environment as waste or 
polluting emissions. The Earth, being a finite planet, has a limited capability to supply 
resources and to absorb pollution” (2010: 9). Corporations have a vital role to play in this 
fundamental sustainability also, beginning with a modest recognition of their necessary 
subordination to the interests of maintaining a balanced ecosystem 
 
To help clarify the different approaches to corporate social responsibility, Garriga and Mele 
(2004) attempt a classification of the main theories and related approaches into four groups:  




creation, and its social activities are only a means to achieve economic results; political 
theories, concerned with the power of corporations in society and the responsible use of this 
power in the political arena; integrative theories, concerned with the corporation’s 
responsibility to meet social demands; and ethical theories, based on ethical responsibilities 
of corporations to society. These theories represent four dimensions of corporate activity 
related to profits, political performance, social demands and ethical values. How to balance 
and integrate these four dimensions remains a vital task in resolving the relationship of 
business and society.  
It is clear that corporations are now facing an imperative to act more responsibly. Many large 
international corporations internationally have responded to this imperative with well 
formulated, and often well-orchestrated initiatives on demonstrating their commitment to 
social and environmental responsibility. However, questions are often addressed concerning 
the sincerity of corporate social and environmental initiatives; the legality of company 
directors engaging in these concerns; and, equally, the legality of the trustees of investment 
institutions attending to these interests; and the verifiability of CSR activities and outcomes. 
 
    9.3    The Impact of Corporate Social Responsibility 
The narrow focus of corporate governance exclusively upon the internal control of the firm 
and simply complying with regulation is no longer tenable. In the past this has allowed 
corporations to act in extremely irresponsible ways by externalizing social and environmental 
costs. In the name of normal business activity, corporations were too often given a licence to 
destroy people’s lives and damage the environment. “Just as evolution has made the shark a 
perfect eating machine, the device of limited liability has allowed the corporation to perfect 




externalize the costs of stock price maximisation, that is to push those costs onto others. The 
corporation is the perfect externalizing machine” (Mitchell 2001:2). Corporate objectives 
described as ‘wealth generating’ too frequently have resulted in a tragic loss of well-being to 
communities and the ecology. But increasingly in the future the licence to operate will not be 
given so readily to corporations and other entities (Clarke 2019a). A licence to operate will 
depend on maintaining the highest standards of integrity and practice in corporate behaviour. 
Corporate governance essentially will involve a sustained and responsible monitoring of not 
just the financial health of the company, but also the social and environmental impact of the 
company.  
 
Explaining the paradox that it is those industries and businesses that are often considered the 
most irresponsible and damaging to people and the environment that have often apparently 
been at the forefront of the CSR movement, Crane et al. (2014a: 3) argue: 
“Corporations are clearly taking up this challenge. This began with ‘the usual suspects’ such 
as companies in the oil, chemical and tobacco industries. As a result of media pressure, major 
disasters, and sometimes government regulation, these companies realized that propping up 
oppressive regimes, being implicated in human rights violations, polluting the environment, 
or misinforming and deliberately harming their customers, just to give a few examples, were 
practices that had to be reconsidered if they wanted to survive and prosper.” 
 
Today, however, virtually all businesses, industries and markets are experiencing increasing 
demands to legitimate their practices. For example, banking, retailing, tourism, food and 
beverages, entertainment and healthcare industries, once considered comparatively 




socially and environmentally and are coming under insistent pressure to apply more 
responsible practices (Crane et al. 2014: 3–4). 
 
A substantial increase in the range, significance and impact of corporate social and 
environmental initiatives in recent years suggests the growing materiality of sustainability. 
Once regarded as a concern of a few philanthropic individuals and companies, corporate 
social and environmental responsibility appears to be becoming established in many 
corporations as a critical element of strategic direction, and one of the main drivers of 
business development, as well as an essential component of risk management. The 
relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and corporate social responsibility 
remains complex, with a contested interface (Jain and Jamali 2016).  Yet, corporate social 
and environmental responsibility seems to be rapidly moving from the margins to the 
mainstream of corporate activity, with greater recognition of a direct and inescapable 
relationship between corporate governance, corporate responsibility, and sustainable 
development. The burgeoning importance of this newly revived movement is demonstrated 
by the current frequency and scale of CSR activity at every level (Calder and Culverwell 
2005: 43).  
      9.4   Multilateral Initiatives on Corporate Social Responsibility 
A growing number of international agencies are committed campaigners for corporate social 
and environmental responsibility, led by the United Nations, ILO and World Bank. The 
OECD (2009) also is active in the promotion of corporate social responsibility in its 
guidelines for the operations of multinational corporations; and the European Union is 
directly encouraging corporate social responsibility as the business contribution to sustainable 




on European enterprises to strive to comply with and act in accordance with internationally 
recognised CSR guidelines and principles, such as the:  
 OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (2008; 2018);  
 10 principles of the UN Global Compact (2013);  
 UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (2011);  
 ILO Tri-partite Declaration of Principles on Multinational Enterprises and Social 
Policy (2017); and  
 ISO 26000 Guidance Standard on Social Responsibility (2010)                                           
(European Commission 2014). 
 
At the national level a growing number of governments in Europe, and across the globe, have 
identified strongly with the call for corporate social and environmental responsibility, even 
with the evident difficulties in applying successive UN international agreements on emissions 
reductions and creating an effective international climate policy regime. The UNEP (2019 xx) 
review of climate change concludes “Decarbonizing the global economy will require fundamental 
structural changes, which should be designed to bring multiple co-benefits for humanity and planetary 
support systems.” 
 
 The growing body of international policy on corporate responsibility includes much on why 
companies should voluntarily adopt a responsible approach to business but little on how this 
might be achieved in practice (Lindgreen and Swaen 2010; Yuan et al. 2011: 76). Partly this 
is due to the difficulty in defining corporate responsibility in practice – its meaning can be 
different depending on a company’s size, industry and location. Ultimately, every company 




be unique to the company concerned: “It is important to reemphasize that corporate 
sustainability is fundamentally a complex problem and there are no approaches that 
universally apply. Corporations are faced with differing stakeholder demands, continually 
shifting priorities, and a multitude of alternatives to address their sustainability challenges” 
(Searcy 2012: 250). 
 
Yet with the development, and widespread voluntary uptake of international standards and 
frameworks for corporate responsibility such as the United Nations Global Compact (UNGC) 
and the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), research into effective implementation is 
becoming important (Baumann and Scherer 2010; Schembera 2012). These instruments 
provide broad principles and reporting frameworks but leave it to the companies to decide 
how to implement these principles. The GRI has been adopted worldwide as a means of 
integrated reporting. Together with many other international, national and private sector 
initiatives the knowledge and practice of sustainability and corporate social responsibility has 
gained global significance. However, the proliferating range of sustainability standards and 
initiatives themselves poses challenges even for corporations committed to performing well: 
“The current CSR landscape is complex and multi-faceted. There are now literally hundreds 
of private initiatives, often with their own code or set of standards and principles which offer 
guidance on social and environmental issues. Their focus, membership, usage, and structures 
vary widely. In the main, they share a desire to help enhance the contribution that business 
organizations can make to improvement of social and environmental conditions, including 
labour and other human rights. Since existing instruments evolve and new ones are emerging, 
a comprehensive yet accessible listing is almost impossible. In this complex universe there 




OECD Guidelines – and one important international CSR initiative – the UN Global 
Compact (UNGC) – which have either been developed and formally agreed by governments 
or received high-level recognition by governments at an international level. Indeed, the 
standards and principles set out in the ILO Declaration, the OECD Guidelines and the UNGC 
are universal and derive directly from international normative frameworks. The ILO 
Declaration and the OECD Guidelines provide detailed recommendations on responsible 
business conduct, while helping businesses and stakeholders distinguish between the 
responsibility of enterprises and that of the state. The UNGC provides a high profile means 
for mobilizing and encouraging enterprises to integrate CSR into their daily operations” 
(OECD 2009: 237). 
 
Integrative work on combining the strengths of the central international CSR and 
sustainability initiatives and making frameworks more compatible and coherent is being 
progressed (Global Compact/GRI 2007). Paul Hohnen participated in the development of the 
ISO 26000 standard, contributed to the updated OECD Guidelines, and was a Strategy 
Director of the GRI, and has helped provide useful integrative tools (GRI 2011a, 2011b). 
Sustainability is receiving considerably increased attention internationally, and the material 
link with economic, social and environmental benefits is becoming increasingly appreciated.  
 
     9.5   Symbolic or Substantive Corporate Social Responsibility? 
Nevertheless, there is a need for better understanding of exactly what companies are doing in 
the absence of clear practical guidance. Are these frameworks simply being used as window 
dressing or are they motivating real change? Is there a need for governments to take a more 




shareholder activism, David et al. concluded that their results were “consistent with other 
research which indicates managers may opt for symbolic, rather than substantive, responses 
to external pressures” (2007: 98). For example, when it comes to environmental performance, 
Berrone and Gomez Mejia point out that it might be easier for a company to set up a board 
environment committee than to actually reduce or eliminate toxic emissions (2009: 120).  
 
Whitehouse is also sceptical, pointing out the obvious gap between the seemingly 
enthusiastic adoption of CSR by companies and the ambiguous nature of the concept: “This 
ability to implement policies founded upon a concept that remains ambiguous raises a 
number of questions regarding the definition employed by those who profess a commitment 
to CSR, why they have chosen to implement CSR policies, how they develop those policies 
and their value in terms of reducing the adverse impact of corporate activity” (2006: 280). 
 
At the corporate level the World Business Council for Sustainable Development and the 
World Economic Forum Global Corporate Citizenship Initiative have projected corporate 
responsibility in the minds of the international business elite (WBCSD 2014, 2015; WEF 
2012). Other business organizations active in promoting CSR include the Business Leaders’ 
Initiative on Human Rights, the Conference Board, Business in the Community, and Business 
for Social Responsibility. A large number of leading corporations have signed up for the 
Global Reporting Initiative and more than 2,000 international corporations now publish 
reports on their CSR performance (many accessible on www.csrwire.com) (GRI 2015a). 
Reinforcing the new-found willingness on the part of corporate executives to disclose their 
commitments to CSR are the new indices including the Dow Jones Sustainability Index and 




groups offering guidance and actively monitoring CSR activities along the entire length of 
the global value chain (World Bank 2003). 
 
 9.6    The Integrity of Corporate Social Responsibility 
Despite the recent burst of enthusiasm for corporate social and environmental responsibility 
in some quarters the concept and practice of CSR still provokes a degree of understandable 
scepticism, partly due to CSR’s record of lapsing into amoral apologetics for unacceptable 
corporate behaviour, and to the apparent capacity of corporations particularly in the resources 
sector to express CSR ideals while engaging in every opportunity to make money regardless 
of the environmental or social consequences (Christian Aid 2004; Corporate Responsibility 
Coalition 2005; OECD Watch 2005; Wright and Nyberg 2015).  
 
David Vogel in a review conducted for the Brookings Institute, The Market for Virtue: The 
Potential and Limits of Corporate Social Responsibility (2005), contends there are many 
reasons why companies may choose to behave more responsibly in the absence of legal 
requirements to do so, including strategic, defensive, altruistic or public-spirited motivations. 
However, despite pressure from consumers for responsibly made products, the influence of 
socially responsible investors, and the insistent call for companies to be accountable to a 
broader community of stakeholders there are important limits to the market for virtue: 
 
“CSR is best understood as a niche rather than a generic strategy: it makes sense for some 
firms in some areas under some circumstances. Many of the proponents of corporate social 




responsibly in some areas, some firms can be expected to behave more responsibly in more 
areas. This assumption is misinformed. There is a place in the market economy for 
responsible firms. But there is also a large place for their less responsible competitors . . . 
Precisely because CSR is voluntary and market-driven, companies will engage in CSR only 
to the extent that it makes business sense for them to do. Civil regulation has proven capable 
of forcing some companies to internalize some of the negative externalities associated with 
some of their economic activities. But CSR can reduce only some market failures” (Vogel 
2005: 3–4). 
 
Vogal concludes that CSR has a multidimensional nature, and companies, like individuals, do 
not always exhibit consistent moral or social behaviour, and may behave better in some 
countries than others depending on the social and environmental policies existing there. Since 
the origins of capitalism there have always been more or less responsible firms, and though it 
may be heartening that executives in many highly visible firms may be becoming more 
responsive (if only as a result of external stakeholder pressures) the reality is that the amounts 
wasted on the losses due to financial fraud, and the very substantial – and some would argue 
unwarranted – increases in executive compensation in corporations in the recent period far 
exceed any resources companies have devoted to CSR. More worryingly still, the adoption of 
corporate social responsibility principles by corporations around the world in recent decades, 
seems to have coincided with the largely successful systemic attempt by corporations to 
avoid public taxation, in the process critically undermining the fiscal basis of social 
democracy and the welfare state with serious long term consequences for the communities in 
which they operate as public services such as health and education are undermined by lack of 




erosion and profit shifting by corporations engaged in increasingly aggressive tax avoidance 
schemes (European Commission 2016). 
 
In a similar vein Deborah Doane (2005), is sceptical regarding optimism about the power of 
market mechanisms to deliver social and environmental change, referring to the key myths 
informing the CSR movement as: 
 The market can deliver both short-term financial returns and long-term social 
benefits.    
 The ethical consumer will drive change. 
 There will be a competitive ‘race to the top’ over ethics amongst businesses.  
  In the global economy countries will compete to have the best ethical practices. 
 
In support of her argument that these are largely mythological trends, she highlights the 
insistence of stock markets upon short-term results, and the failure of companies to invest in 
long-term benefits; the considerable gap between green consciousness expressed by 
consumers and their consumer behaviour; the inconsistency between companies’ alignment to 
CSR schemes and their successful efforts to bring about the sustained fall in corporate 
taxation in the United States and other jurisdictions in recent decades; and finally the 
evidence emerging in developing countries of governments competing to reduce their 
insistence on the observance of social and environmental standards to attract international 
investment (Doane 2005). In a bleak prognosis, Wright and Nyberg (2015) insist corporations 
are simply obscuring the link between endless economic growth and the ultimate end of the 





It may well be the case that further significant legislative and regulatory intervention will be 
required to ensure all corporations fully respond to the growing public demand that they 
recognize their wider social and environmental responsibilities. However, it is useful to 
examine how far CSR objectives can be achieved within existing law and regulation. If there 
is substantial evidence of leading corporations demonstrating it is possible to voluntarily 
commit to social and environmental performance and to achieve commercial success – 
perhaps because of, rather than in spite of, ethical commitments – then it will be more 
straightforward to press for the legislative changes necessary to deal with corporations that 
refuse to acknowledge their wider responsibilities, as well as finding appropriate legislative 
support for companies that wish to develop further their CSR commitments. 
 
       9.7    The Fragility of the Natural Environment 
What is emerging as the most important – and fragile – relationship of all, is that between 
corporate activity and the ecology. Climate change caused by greenhouse gases, issued 
largely by the burning of fossil fuels, is endangering the natural environment of the planet. 
This has become the most critical issue for both corporate governance and corporate social 
responsibility to address - if corporations and economies are to achieve sustainability, they 
can only do so through creating a balance with the natural environment (Hawken et al 1999). 
The corporate world is a long way from achieving this balance: six of the largest ten 
corporations in the world by revenue are energy companies firmly based in the fossil fuel 





Cogan (2006) illuminates in detail the connection between corporate governance and climate 
change in a comprehensive examination of how the world’s largest corporations are 
positioning themselves in a carbon-constrained world. Investors are increasingly assigning 
value to companies responding to the business challenges and opportunities posed by climate 
change and will assign more risk to companies that are slow to do this. Corporate 
effectiveness in combating climate change will increasingly be measured in terms of board 
oversight, management execution, public disclosure, emissions accounting and strategic 
planning for emissions reduction. 
 
Stern (2006) considers the challenges of building and sustaining frameworks for international 
collective action on climate change with important initiatives coming from both national 
governments and corporations. The various dimensions of action required to reduce the risks 
of climate change are considered: both for mitigation (including through carbon prices and 
markets, interventions to support low-carbon investment and technology diffusion, 
cooperation on technology development and deployment, and action to reverse deforestation), 
and for adaptation. These dimensions of remedial action are interdependent: a carbon price is 
essential to provide incentives for investment in low-carbon technology around the world, 
and can be strongly complemented by international co-operation to bring down the costs of 
new low carbon technologies. The success of international co-operation on mitigation will 
determine the scale of action required for adaptation that is how we learn to cope with climate 
change.  An overview of existing international co-operation on climate change indicates the 
immense scale of the problem, and the huge global effort that will be required to resolve this. 
Responsible corporate governance will be essential to securing a sustainable balance between 





Corporations have a central role to play in the two main strategies for combating climate 
change by mitigation and adaptation. Diminishing the potentially catastrophic consequences 
of the increasing impact of climate change will require urgent efforts to reduce carbon 
emissions. Corporations are required to make a major contribution to emissions mitigation, 
and if they refuse to do so will face reputational damage, higher energy costs, legal costs and 
fines from increasingly rigorous emissions regulation. More critically they may find it 
increasingly difficult to transfer the risk they encounter through insurance, and also discover 
they are being deserted by investors and credit providers concerned at the exposure to 
emissions intensive sectors, stranded assets, and declining industries (Barker et al 2016; 
Clarke 2016). 
 
The hazards associated with climate change are both considerable and pervasive and are 
characterised by their complexity and inter-connectedness. The dramatic climactic 
discontinuities caused by climate change “may give rise to cascading risks of potentially 
unforeseeable magnitude” (Godden et al 2013:235). Therefore, climate change cannot be 
framed as one of technical risk management for government and specialists; it is the 
responsibility of everyone, but particularly those in leadership positions in corporations that 








10.    Conclusions   
10.1    Fatal Weaknesses in Corporate Governance 
The discipline of corporate governance has developed considerably in recent decades. 
Governments, regulators, and legal and financial institutions have firmly embraced corporate 
governance as the means to deliver accountability, performance and integrity. Whether 
corporate governance in finance, or in any other business sector, can deliver practically and 
consistently on these essential principles remains open to some speculation. But fatal 
weaknesses also are becoming more apparent in both the academic analysis of corporate 
governance and the ensuing policy deliberations: 
 Corporate governance has become identified almost exclusively with endless 
templates for compliance and regulation;  
 Corporate governance is overwhelmed by the intellectual constrictions of agency 
theory (Weinstein 2012; Clarke 2013, 2014a); 
 Corporate governance is neglectful of diversity, creativity and innovation in corporate 
forms and activity;  
 Corporate governance is unaware of its impact upon the intensification of inequality 
in both the corporation and wider society (Ireland 2005; Piketty 2014; Clarke et al 
2019);  
 Corporate governance is a discipline with a narrow focus on empirical studies of 
abstracted variables and bereft of attempts at holistic explanations of integrated and 
interrelated social and economic institutions and systems;  
 Corporate governance is ill-equipped to deal with the urgent imperative of climate 





The advance of corporate governance over the last century has proved highly contested as 
different eras of governance, with associated paradigms of explanation and implementation, 
have both reflected and reinforced changes in the wider political economy through successive 
eras of corporate governance (Figure 4). For much of the 20th century the lessons of world 
war and the great depression of the 1930s had confirmed how essential it was to maintain 
institutions and industry firmly grounded in the common interest of maintaining economic 
prosperity and social justice. Yet in the competitive economies pursuing expansion and 
transformation in the 1970s there was a reawakening of sterner philosophies. 
Figure  4    Evolution of Corporate Governance Paradigms 
 
Towards the end of the twentieth century it seemed apparent that the market-based system, 
and the neoclassical economic rationale on which it was constructed, was very much in the 
ascendancy. Among the strongest intellectual forces of this neoclassical legacy is 
undoubtedly a particularly lethal, stripped-down interpretation of agency theory and 
shareholder value. How the crudest of conceptions could capture such a hegemonic hold in 
the way corporations are conceived is a subject worthy of deep study in the sociology of 
knowledge. The reformulation of team production theory by Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout 
(1999, 2001; Clarke 2015a) presents a more recognizable and meaningful explanation of the 
purpose of the corporation and the duties of directors, though more radical critiques would 
suggest the imminent need for a recognition as the corporation as commons (Deakin 2019).  
  
10.2    Changing Paradigms of Corporate Governance 
Throughout the last century there were always radical voices that offered a different critique 




increasingly dominated the global economy. In different eras, socialist, progressive, 
communitarian and stakeholder ideas possessed resonance, and an appeal to an alternative 
economic and political system, that led to many countries pursuing a different path of 
economic development. It should not be forgotten that for much of the twentieth century in 
many countries large sectors of industry were placed into public ownership because of the 
recognition of widespread market, governance and managerial failure; while the international 
privatization movement since the 1980s Reagan/Thatcher era has reversed this trend, doubts 
remain about the viability of replacing public monopolies with private monopolies and 
oligopolies in many countries (Clarke and Pitelis 1995). In addition, the voluntary, social and 
cooperative sectors of many economies remain large and vibrant, catering for needs the 
market neglects. Radical critiques of capitalism survive and have achieved a new resonance 
with the realization that unrestrained capitalism is threatening the ecology and community in 
a more critical way than ever before. 
 
To meet the imminent challenge of social and environmental sustainability in a post-carbon 
economy, further rethinking of corporate purpose, corporate governance and directors’ duties 
will be essential. This sustainability revolution has only just commenced, but in the course of 
the twenty-first century will transform business and society towards a digital, decentralised 
and decarbonised future.  
 
Presently there is a growing and insistent questioning of the sustainability of a carbon 
economy in the context of increasing pollution and global warming. While this interest in 
corporate social and environmental responsibility was deflected in the urgency of restoring 




immediate concerns relating to the Covid 19 pandemic, it is these profound questions of the 
impact of corporations upon social and environmental sustainability that will preoccupy the 
paradigmatic contests of corporate governance throughout the remaining decades of the 
twenty-first century. In a context where the adequacy of the existing dominant paradigms of 
corporate governance are increasingly challenged, the search for coherent new paradigms is a 
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Light Blue – executive stock options granted; Dark Blue – executive stock options realised. 
CEOs compensation in the top 350 US companies by annual sales. Workers compensation is the 
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